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Appellants My Fun Life Corp., a Delaware Corporation, Dan E. Edwards, and Carrie L. 
Edwards (husband and wife), by and th.rough their attorneys of record Mary E. Shea, Me1Till and 
Me1Till Chartered, and Michael Hague, Hague Law Offices PLLC, state their Appellant's Brief as 
follows: 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of the Case 
This is a breach of an employment contract case in which the District Court found that 
Appellants, My Fun Life Corp. (''MFL'' herein), acting through Dan Edwards the sole owner, did 
not have cause to tem1inate Respondent Thomas Lunneborg from his position as Chief Operating 
Officer (COO) with the company. (April 17, 2017 Memorandum Decision, Conclusions of Law 
and Order Following Court Trial pp. 8-28). 1 
MFL was a multilevel marketing company that began in 2013 by selling membership only 
access to discounted travel packages and products over the internet. Members would recruit 
additional "downstream" members, and earn compensation from the company based on those 
sales. As more members joined, compensation for the upper level members increased. The 
discounted travel product proved attractive and membership grew very quickly that first year of 
operations. (Tr.p. 181 , L. 7-25;p.182,L. l-25;p.183,L.1-6). Inearly2014,MFLwaslooking 
to bring other products to market that members/distributors could distribute, specifically, 
nutritional products and h·aining products. The company was targeted to "baby boomers," and 
1 It appears the Clerk's Record did not include the Court's Memorandum Decision, Conclusions of Law and Order 
Following Court Trial as is required by 1.A.R. Rule 28(b)( I )(h). Appellants are making a Motion herewith to augment 
the record pursuant to l.A.R. 30 to include this decision. A copy of the decision is attached to the electronic version 
of Appellant 's Brief for the Comt's convenience. 
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preliminary market research indicated these were the product lines that would be most successful. 
The MFL website at the time it hired Lunneborg in May 2014 advertised that it intended to expand 
into these distribution areas. (Tr. p. 283, L. 18-25; p. 284, L 1-25). The evidence is undisputed 
that leading development of new products to market for MFL was one ofLunneborg's central job 
expectations when he was recrnited by MFL in the spring of 2014, and hired to begin work May 
19, 2014. (Tr. p. 271, L. 7-10). Lunneborg's experience and skill set from working in research 
and product development at another multilevel marketing company called OxyFresh was a key 
reason why he was recruited and hired by MFL to be its COO. (Tr. 285 L. 10-25). 
Lunneborg had been employed with OxyFresh for almost twenty years before he decided 
to join MFL as their Chief Operations Officer. (Tr. p. 150-152). Lunneborg and his friend and 
longtime collaborator Dr. Todd Schlapfer had developed the Life Shotz nutritional products for 
OxyFresh. (Tr. p. 152, 1. 22-25; p. 153, L. 1-22). Life Shotz originally operated as a division of 
OxyFresh. Sometime in 2016, Life Shotz was spun out of OxyFresh as a stand-alone multi-level 
marketing company under the name Life Matters. (Tr. p. 150, 1. 3-20). OxyFresh transitioned in 
early 2014 into a retail company. (Tr. p. 148, L. 16-22). Lunneborg was also a shareholder of 
OxyFresh until he sold his shares in 2016. (Tr. p. 238 L. 10-21). 
MFL fired Lunneborg because Dan Edwards discovered that Lunneborg had a verbal 
noncompete agreement with Oxyfresh that would have prevented him from performing his central 
job duties as COO. MFL additionally fired Lunneborg for not being honest or fully fo1thcoming 
with MFL about his ongoing contract negotiations with that competitor regarding the noncompete 
agreement. Although the contract had not been signed, OxyFresh' s Chief Executive Officer 
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Richard Brooke had told Dan Edwards that he believed that Lunneborg had agreed to it verbally, 
and as of July 2014 it hadn' t been signed because they were simply cleaning up contract language. 
OxyFresh was paying Lunneborg a $5,000/month fee as a consultant to the company with that 
understanding. Lunneborg was being requested to provide advice to the company indefinitely. 
Although Dan Edwards knew and agreed that Lunneborg could consult for OxyFresh, he was 
misled by Lunneborg, who repeatedly told him there was no non-compete agreement or 
understanding with OxyFresh. When Dan Edwards learned that was not true, in late July 2014, he 
had no choice but to terminate Lunneborg. MFL could not survive with a COO who was prohibited 
by another relationship from developing product lines to bring to market. 
Dan Edwards was not required to take the word of Lunneborg that he had no non-compete 
agreement or verbal expectation with OxyFresh and that he was not going to sign one, when he 
received credible information that contradicted this story. Dan was entitled to rely on the 
information he had received from Richard Brooke, which he confirmed with Dr. Schlapfer before 
taking any action. Dan was entitled to rely on the information he received that Lunneborg had 
been telling Brooke that he was not hired to bring or develop products to market for MFL, a fact 
Dan and Lunneborg both knew to be untrue. (Plaintiff's Exh. 47, Brooke dep. Tr. p. 41 , L. 6-21; 
Tr. 344, L. 5-7). 
The conflict of interest was confirmed in a subsequent lunch conversation between Dan 
and Carrie Edwards and Dr. Schlapfer, who also worked as an independent consultant for 
OxyFresh. (Tr. p. 525, l. 24-25; p. 526; p. 527 L. 1-14). Dr. Schlapfer testified that it was his 
understanding from Brooke from the very beginning that Lunneborg would never be allowed to 
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do any product development for MFL by OxyFresh. (Plaintiffs Exh. 48; Tr. p. 33, L. 8-16; Tr. p. 
34, L.12-19). 
Under the MFL employment contract negotiated by the parties, if Lunneborg was not fired 
for cause, he was entitled to a six months' severance package of $60,000. These damages were 
trebled by the District Court under the Idaho Wage Claim Act, LC. § 45-615, and attorneys' fees 
were awarded. The final judgment entered on June 20, 2017, awarded Lunneborg a sum of 
$366,277.95, including attorneys' fees and costs, with post-judgment interest of 5.625% per annum 
accruing. 
The District Court misapplied the law of termination for cause by substih1ting its judgment 
on credibility for that of the employer. Several of the factual findings by the District Court are 
contradicted by Lunneborg' s own testimony, and therefore cannot be based on substantial and 
competent evidence. This Couti must reverse and enter final judgment in favor of MFL and Dan 
Edwards on the issue of liability. 
The District Court compounded its error in legal analysis by also finding that the corporate 
veil of MFL could be pierced to reach the personal assets of not only Dan Edwards, but also the 
personal and separate property of his spouse, Canie Edwards. The District Couti misapplied the 
law of "piercing the corporate veil," by relying on financial transactions that were legal and fall 
within the usual business practices of multi-level marketing companies and closely held family 
businesses, most of which occurred before the Edwards had even met Lunneborg. These financial 
transactions were made pursuant to appropriate accounting procedures that segregated payments 
and funds transferred between the corporations, updated every few days and reconciled weekly, to 
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assure there was no commingling. The District CoUli committed legal enor by considering 
financial transactions that occU1Ted while Lunneborg admits the corporation was still financially 
successful, healthy, viable, and growing. Those transactions could not evidence an alter ego or 
any intent to defraud LU1meborg or any other creditor absent proof of legal or other impropriety or 
faulty accounting procedures, and they should not have supp01ied a decision to pierce the corporate 
veil. The District Couti committed enor by relying on the subsequent 2016 bankruptcy of MFL 
to pierce the corporate veil, without placing the bankruptcy in the context required by law. There 
was no proof offered to show that improper or illegal depletion of corporate assets with intent to 
defraud Lunneborg is what caused the bankruptcy. 
The District CoU1i further e1Ted in its legal analysis of piercing the corporate veil by 
extending the law of Idaho to find that piercing the corporate veil can reach not only the personal 
assets of the owners of a corporation, but also the separate property of their spouses. The District 
Cami committed legal error by holding that because Canie Edwards benefitted from the financial 
transactions through her community interest of Dan's ownership of MFL, her personal assets and 
separate prope1iy were exposed to the corporation' s liabilities. Even for states which have 
recognized that the corporate veil may be pierced for non-owners of a corporation, this holding 
stretches the law beyond recognition. No case anywhere in the country has held that merely 
accepting community or marital benefit of a spouse's ownership and control of a closely held 
corporation exposes that spouses' personal assets and separate prope1iy to the liabilities of the 
corporation. If this Court agrees with the District Court and adopts a new rule of law in Idaho 
that pe1mits the corporate veil to be pierced for non-owners of a corporate entity, proof of decision 
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making authority on behalf of the corporate entity, specifically related to the conduct that indicates 
the veil should be pierced, must be a legal prerequisite to piercing the corporate veil for any such 
individual. Every jurisdiction that has expanded the piercing the veil doctrine to apply to non-
owners has applied this prerequisite. 
Finally, if this Court affirms the findings of the District Court on the merits of the breach 
of contract claim, this Court should examine the ruling on attorneys' fees in the District Court. 
The District CoUii approved of an award of $167,028.69 in fees and costs. (R. p. 172-189). This 
Court should reduce that award, because the District Corni improperly considered a discovery 
dispute that had been previously resolved with a judgment entered against MFL on a motion for 
sanctions, in justifying the time and resources plaintifI' s counsel invested in this case. Considering 
this discovery dispute again in the context of the overall final award amounted to permitting double 
recovery for Lunneborg for litigating that discovery dispute. The District CoUii arbitrarily 
imposed a mere ten percent discount of the time claimed by five plaintiffs attorneys to prepare for 
a three-day trial, despite finding that the hours claimed shocked the conscience of the court. The 
facts of this case and the law of this case are not complicated. The District Cami so found. MFL 
should not have to pay for that overinvestment of legal resources into this case. 
B. Prior Proceedings 
Lunneborg filed his original complaint against MFL on December 8, 2014 alleging that 
MFL terminated him without cause and breached his contract, and MFL violated the Idaho Wage 
Claim Act, J.C. § 45-601. Lunneborg additionally alleged that his termination violated public 
policy, and that MFL breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing. (R. p. 13-22). MFL 
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answered, denying most of the claims, and counterclaiming that Lunneborg fraudulently induced 
MFL to enter into the agreement; that Lunneborg breached his duty of good faith and fair dealing; 
and that Lunneborg was unjustly enriched. (R. p. 26-43). 
On September 8, 2015, Lunneborg sought leave to amend to add Dan and Carrie Edwards 
as defendants, alleging that MFL was used by them as an alter ego. Leave was granted without 
objection and the First Amended Complaint was filed on December 21 , 2015. (R. p. 70-82). MFL 
answered but did not plead any affirmative defenses or counterclaims. (R. p. 82-93) . 
On June 22, 2016, MFL filed for bankruptcy and filed a notice with the District Comi of 
the same. As a result, on September 27, 2016 Lunneborg requested a continuance of the trial date, 
which was granted. Trial was held March 13-15, 2017. After closing arguments were submitted 
by simultaneous briefing, on April 1 7, 201 7, the District Court issued its Memorandum Decision, 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, finding for Lunneborg on his breach of contract 
and Idaho Wage Clain1 Act counts. The Court specifically found that 1) Expectation of bringing 
new product to market for MFL was a purpose, but not a central purpose, of his employment with 
MFL; 2) Lum1eborg could not have brought a product to market in the two months he was 
employed; and 3) Dan Edwards was mistaken and based his decision on "false rumor" that 
Lwmeborg was negotiating a non-compete agreement with OxyFresh that would prevent him from 
developing product for MFL, finding as a matter of fact that because no contract had been signed, 
this was a effectively a non-issue. 
The District Comi fmiher found that Dan Edwards ' profen-ed reasons for termination were 
"pretext," in that he actually fired Lunneborg because he did not want to reverse engineer an 
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OxyFresh nutritional product called Life Shotz. This evidence is in dispute, and it is appellant' s 
position that this finding was not based on substantial or competent evidence. Even if this Couti 
must affi1m this finding of fact, the allegation is not sufficient to meet Lunneborg's burden of 
proof and persuasion on the issue of pretext as a matter of law. 
The District Court found that the corporate veil of MFL could be pierced, because 1) Dan 
Edwards ignored corporate formalities; 2) the Edwards did not pay themselves a salary but instead 
earned commissions as upstream distributors/members, and MFL paid Dan Edwards distributions; 
3) the Edwards allowed MFL to pay some of their automobile expenses for their personal vehicles 
as business expenses for work related vehicle use; 4) the Edwards used business cards for most of 
their corporate financial transactions, and for some of their personal transactions, although the 
evidence is undisputed that they had an accounting system that coded all such expenditures to the 
appropriate corporate or personal account, 5) in 2013-2014, while MFL was indisputably flush 
with cash MFL lent money to the Edwards' other businesses that as of 2014, had not yet been 
repaid; 6) In 2013 and 2014, MFL paid most of the rent and utilities for the building that was first 
leased to own and then purchased outright by a holding company for the Edwards; and 7) MFL 
went bankrupt in June 2016. 
MFL and the Edwards moved the Court to reconsider its judgment under I.R.C.P. 59(e). 
Canie Edwards was not sued for any theories of direct liability in the Amended Complaint. Carrie 
Edwards did not consent that her separate property could be used to satisfy community debt as is 
required by I.C. § 32-912. The Edwards argued that Idaho law pem1its piercing of the corporate 
veil only for shareholders of the corporation, and Carrie was not a shareholder. 
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The District Comt rejected these arguments, although the Comt apparently agreed that 
Carrie had not been sued or held liable directly for breach of the employment contract. The District 
Comi held that it could pierce the corporate veil to execute judgment against MFL on her personal 
and separate property assets, because 1) she enjoyed the community benefits of MFL's alleged 
corporate malfeasance; and 2) Carrie assisted with the books of MFL and therefore made the 
financial transactions which caused the comt to pierce the corporate veil. (R. p. 158-171 ). 
After Lunneborg submitted his affidavits and evidence in supp01t of his cost and fee award, 
MFL and the Edwards objected. The original demand for fees and costs was $223,564.50, 
representing 1042 hours for five attorneys' work on this case that culminated in a three-day trial. 
The District Comt agreed with MFL and the Edwards that this initial cost and fee request shocked 
the Judge's conscience. Specifically, the Court stated that "1042 hours of attorney fees to take a 
matter to a three-day court trial is shocking." (R. p. 179). The Court fmther stated, " [i]n more 
than fifteen years as a district comtjudge, this Comt has never been presented with anywhere close 
to such a high amount of hours for an attorney fee request." (R. p. 179-180). The Comt then 
arbitrarily reduced the hours by 10%, explaining that the remaining 937.8 hours invested by five 
attorneys were justified by 1) a discovery dispute jnvolving previous counsel for the defense; and 
2) the MFL filing of bankruptcy. 
The final judgment entered on June 20, 20 17, awarded Lunneborg a sum of $366,277.95, 
including attorneys' fees and costs, with post-judgment interest of 5.625% per annum accruing. 
(R. p. 188-190). 
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C. Statement of Facts 
1. Breach of Contract 
The employment contract entered into by Lunneborg and Dan Edwards on April 8, 2014 
stated, among other things, as follows: 
1) Position. You will serve in a full-time capacity as Chief Operating Officer 
of the Company. You will repmt to the CEO. By signing this letter, you represent 
you are under no contractual commitments inconsistent with your obligations to 
this Company. 
4) Period of Employment. Your employment with the Company will 
be at will; meaning that either you or the Company will be entitled to terminate 
your employment at any time and for any reason, with or without cause. Any 
contrary representations which may have been made to you are superseded by this 
offer. This is the full and complete agreement between you and the company on 
this term. Although your job duties, title, compensation and benefits, as well as the 
Company's personnel policies and procedures, may change from time to time, the 
at will nature of your employment may only be changed in an express written 
agreement signed by you and a duly authorized officer of the Company. 
Defendants' Exh. A, p. 341. 
The July 28, 2014 termination letter drafted by Dan Edwards, which was physically 
delivered to Lunneborg on July 29, 2014, cites the following reasons for his termination: 
1. The central purpose of your employment here was to bring health 
and nutritional products to market. You are unable to make any significant progress 
to that end, and whenever I have encouraged you to work on that goal, you have 
refused to take action citing roadblocks that you claim prevent the development of 
new products. 
2. I have also learned that you have been negotiating a consulting 
agreement with your former employer that would expressly prohibit you from 
bringing other new products to market. This is in direct competition with your 
duties at MyFunLIFE and a serious breach of your obligations to us. We cannot 
continue to pay an employee who not only fails to perform the central functions of 
his position, but is motivated to continue in that failure by an outside consulting 
arrangement that requires continued inaction. 
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Defendants' Exh. A., p. 500. 
Before the offer of employment was executed between Lunneborg and MFL, Lunneborg 
knew that developing health and nutritional products to MFL was central to the job being 
discussed. On March 30, 2014, Lunneborg wrote Dr. Shlapfer: 
Dan is going to let me go through all the company's financials on Monday. They 
had good answers to all my questions. Brenda had a great feeling about both. Dan 
said he wants you and I to decide when the product is ready for launch not 
him. He has capital to pay cash for us and production. I get to see that Monday. 
He is pushing hard for me to join as coo or pres. He does not want to handle rwming 
the place. 
Defendants' Exh. A., p. 104 (emphasis added). 
In the cover letter Lunneborg wrote enclosing his offer of employment stated as follows: 
I am also extremely blessed to continue my partnership with Dr. Schlapfer. We've 
already been talking about the new blank canvas we have in front of us to 
create the best products imaginable. We can take any idea from concept to 
finished product that all of your members will love. 
Defendants' Exh. A., p. 510. (emphasis added). 
At trial, Lwmeborg testified clearly and repeatedly that he understood he was recruited by 
MFL to develop product together with Dr. Schlapfer, and that this was a central job function for 
him at MFL. At his first lunch "meet and greet" with the Edwards, which had been arranged by 
Dr. Shlapfer, Lunneborg was told that MFL wanted to start a nutrition product of some kind, and 
a training product of some kind. (Tr. p. 162, L. 7-10). Regarding that initial meeting, Lum1eborg 
testified as follows: 
Q. Okay. At your lunch that day with Dr. Todd to you recall any discussion about 
your background, experience in the production of nutritional products for Oxy? 
A. Yeah. We discussed the background that I had in producing all the different 
products that Oxy carried. 
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Q. Did Dan or Carrie or Dr. Todd indicate that MyFunLife was interested in that 
particular part of your background and expertise? 
A. They were definitely interested in my expertise in producing products. 
Q. Was there any other part of your expe1iise that was discussed as much as your 
background and expertise in producing products? 
A. Yes. The operational role. When they learned everything that I did at Oxy Fresh, 
they became - I could tell that it became more interesting to Dan. 
Q. Would it be fair to say that those two aspects of your skill set were the dominant 
subject of discussion at lunch that day with Dr. Todd? 
A. My skills as running operation and product development, yes. 
Q. And was there any discussion that day at lunch about the prospect of Dr. Todd 
having any interest in paiiicipating in product development for MyFunLife along 
with you? 
A. I believe so. 
Q. And do you recall the substance of that discussion to be? 
A. That Dr. Schlapfer was interested in doing an agreement with Dan and 
producing products. ( emphasis added). 
(Tr. p. 285, L. 3-25; p. 286, L. 1-9). 
At a subsequent dinner between the Edwards and Lunneborg and his then fiance, Da11 made 
it clear that he was not interested in running MFL and he would like to turn over day to day 
operations. But at the dinner, the paiiies also discussed the product development expectations. 
Lunneborg testified: 
Q. Did you discuss making products for My FunLife at that dinner? 
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A. We discussed products. We discussed a lot of things like - when I say products, 
I 'm thinking of a dietaiy or personal care product. We discussed everything from 
a potential vision board, electronic product to all kinds of different ideas, so, yea, 
we discussed everything. 
Q. Did Dai1 related to you at that meeting or previously that he didn't have any 
experience in product development? 
A. Yes, he did. Didn't have any experience. 
Q. And that is one reason he wanted to bring on someone who had that experience? 
A. Yes. He was excited at the opportunity to have me come on board with 
that experience and all the connections that I had to make that process move 
quicker and smoother, to be able to bring in product line or whatever we 
needed to do. 
Q. Okay. Did he give you any indication of what his timeline would be for creating 
product? 
A. He did. We specifically asked- I believe Brenda asked him at what time would 
a product need to be launched, and Dan's response was whenever Tom said that 
he's ready to launch, so if that's six months from now, if that's twelve months from 
now, it' s up to him because he's who knows. 
(Tr.p.1 66, L.15-25; p.167,L. l-16). 
Further, Lunneborg testified directly: 
The central purpose of my employment [at MFL] was to be the Chief Operating 
Officer, to take over the day-to-day, and to lead development on new products if 
they're nutritional, cosmetic or whatever they were. 
(Tr. p. 271, L. 7-10) (emphasis added). 
Dan and Lmmeborg agreed that Lunneborg needed to leave his previous employer on good 
terms. Lunneborg was to the distributors at OxyFresh and Life Shotz "the face of the product." 
He had knowledge of operations at OxyFresh that would be difficult to replace . Richard Brooke, 
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CEO at OxyFresh, was not happy when Lmmeborg gave him his thi1ty days' notice. Lunneborg 
offered, and Brooke and Dan both agreed, that Lunneborg should be pennitted to continue to 
provide consulting services to OxyFresh dming a transition period. Lrnmeborg testified that part 
of his motivation in providing paid consulting services for OxyFresh was that he was taking a pay 
cut to join MFL, and that was pa1t of "bridge money" before the potential of a bonus based on 
financial production would kick in under his MFL contract. (Tr. pp. 173-175; pp. 205-206). 
Lunneborg proposed an agreement under which he would be paid $5,000 per month for consulting 
services to OxyFresh, and Richard Brooke agreed. (Defendants ' Exh. A., p. 458). Dan was 
supportive ofLunneborg' s continued relationship with OxyFresh on good terms, but he did caution 
Lmmeborg to make sure he did not have any non-compete agreements with OxyFresh that would 
prevent him from developing nutritional products for MFL. (Tr. p. 502, L. 24-25; p. 503, L. 1-4). 
By May 9, 2014, Lunneborg encountered obstacles to his proposed transitional role at 
OxyFresh. In a Skype conversation with Dan that day, Lunneborg informed Dan that his 
replacement had been hired. (Defendants' Exh. A., p. 496). Lrnmeborg further stated that Brooke 
"is not being honest with me. It drives me nuts when someone lies ... he privately told our VP of 
Marketing he wants to cut me off completely from any fi eld communication! What is he going to 
say? I died?" (Tr. pp. 208-209). Dan replied that since his replacement had been hired, Lunneborg 
should just quit and cut ties at OxyFresh. Lunneborg replied: " It crossed my mind, but I wouldn' t 
be proud of myself." (Tr. p. 209, L. 2-14). 
On May 15, 2014, Lunneborg wrote to Carrie Edwards: 
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Good news. I had over an hour face to face with RB [Richard Brooke] last night. 
We are good now, he signed my consulting agreement. We have a mutual 
understanding and ended things on good terms ... I'll stay as an advisor and R&D 
guru on the advisory board .. . 
Defendants' Exh. A., p. 506. 
With this representation by Lunneborg, that Brooke had signed a consulting agreement that 
did not restrict Lunneborg's ability to work for MFL, Dan Edwards was operating under the 
assumption that Lunneborg had secured a signed agreement with OxyFresh to accomplish a 
smooth transition that would not limit his ability to work at MFL. But Lunneborg 's situation with 
OxyFresh was not settled at all. Approximately a week later, arow1d the time that Lunneborg was 
beginning work at MFL, Brooke expressed concern that Lunneborg was going to create products 
that would compete with him on a network marketing level. (Tr. pp. 211-212). In Lunneborg's 
words, Brooke "knew what I was capable of." (Tr. p. 212, L. 2). 
Lunneborg by contract was to begin work on May 19, 2014, but Lunneborg was rnanied 
on May 17-18, and he did not report to work until May 21. The next day, May 22, 2014, Lunneborg 
and Dan both spoke at a webinar attended by MFL members. (Defendants' Exh. 49). On that 
same day, a team leader for OxyFresh told Brooke that a MFL representative had told him that 
"Tom Lunneborg is coming over to run our MLM company and we are adding nutrition to our 
line." (Defendants' Exh. A., p. 382). These two events triggered a fluny of activity at OxyFresh 
in which Lunneborg was involved, but the Edwards were not aware. 
Near midnight on May 22, 2014, Lunneborg wrote to Brooke: "I am not moving to My Fun 
Life to bring nutrition. I have copies of what was sent to the members and that is not accurate." 
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(Defendants' Exh. A., p. 382). This statement by Lunneborg was not consistent with March 30, 
2014 communication with Dr. Schlapfer and an April 8, 2014 cover letter to Dan Edwards, nor 
was it consistent with the webinar presentation. (Defendants' Exh. A., pp. 104, 510). 
On May 25, 2014, Brooke wrote an email to Lunneborg, which read: 
FYI. Tom, I believe you are not joining this company with these intentions, but I 
do not believe in Dan' s intentions. He is a promoter and this rep did not just make 
this stuff up out of thin air. If you work on any nutritional ideas for them it will 
change our relationship and our contract. Language will need to be in the contract 
to that effect. 
Defendants' Exh. A., p. 39 (emphasis added). 
On May 26, 2014, Dr. Schlapfer responded to Brooke's May 25, 2014 email. Dr. 
Schlapfer's email, having first been sent to Lunneborg for review and approval, read in significant 
part: 
Are you saying that if Tom engages in the development of nutritional products for 
MFL you will repudiate his contract and relationship with him? Does Tom not 
have complete autonomy to quest and nurture his skills as he sees fit? Are you 
saying the contract that you and Tom have agreed to is now conditioned upon him 
not doing anything akin to what he has been doing as a professional for LS [Life 
Shetz)? 
Defendants' Exh. A., pp. 39; 200. 
On May 28, 2014, Brooke responded to Dr. Schlapfer: 
That is exactly what I am saying. Our sales force will not tolerate Tom developing 
products for a competitive mlm company ... other distribution channels do not 
matter, but MLM does . Tom does have the right to do whatever he wants as I have 
the right to decide who represents us to our sales force. Personally I do not have 
an issue with competing with MFL or with Tom fully expressing his talents. Om 
sales force will have a huge issue with it. Case in point the MFL rep that already 
used the scenario to target one of our top leaders ... said leaders would not at all the 
(sic) Tom would be developing products for another mlm . . . not while an owner of 
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Life Shatz ... not while we are paying him. Plus he wants us to pay him $5,000 a 
month to be a resource on a very limited basis ... that is half his full-time salary. 
We of course need and want Tom to stay in a consulting capacity but if the true 
nature of his departure is to compete with us then we need to just cut ties 
completely. 
Defendants' Exh. A., p. 38. 
On May 28, 2014, OxyFresh attorney Tyler Wilson sent Lunneborg a draft of an 
"Independent Contractor Agreement" to Lunneborg. In all, there were four different drafts of this 
agreement exchanged between OxyFresh and Lunneborg. None were executed. (Plaintiff's Exh. 
25-28). At trial, Lunneborg testified that there were several meetings between himself and Wilson 
and his own attorney Jerry Hergert, resulting in the changing drafts. (Tr. pp. 338-342). The first 
draft of the contract would not allow Lunneborg to "develop, in any manner, nutritional related 
products for a period of Six (6) Months from the Effective Date of this Agreement." (Plaintiff' s 
Exh. 25, p. 2, ~ 3.a). The second draft would not allow Lunneborg to engage in such activity for 
a competitor, the term defined as " . .. any person or entity that creates, formulates, sells or 
distributes nutritional products." (Plaintiff's Exh. 26, p. 3, ~ 3.a). The third draft would not allow 
Lwmeborg to " law1ch a dietary supplement, in any manner, for a competitor of the Company for 
a period of Six (6) months from the Effective Date of this Agreement." (Plaintiff's Exh. 27, p. 3, 
~ 8 .a). The fou11h draft would not allow Lunneborg to " ... develop or create dietary supplements 
or provide consulting services related to dietary supplements in any manner, for any Network 
Marketing, Affiliate Marketing or Multi-Level Marketing company .. . for so long as the Contractor 
holds a position on the Company's Advisory Board. (Plaintiff' s Exh. 28, p. 3, ~ 3.e). This fourth 
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draft included a signature line for Dan and Canie Edwards, while the first three did not. (Plaintiffs 
Exh. 28, p. 10). 
On May 30, 2014, Brooke sent an email to Lwmeborg and Wilson regarding the 
Independent Contractor Agreement which read: 
Things that do not work for Life Shatz. 
5. I think it needs to be very clear what "doing product development work" for 
a competitor looks like. I have no issue with Tom doing work for a NON mlm 
company but doing work . .. even exploratory work, brainstorming, plarming such 
that a product would come out 7 months from now would be a breach in my view. 
Defendants' Exh. A., pp. 202-203. 
The fomth draft of the agreement bears a date of June 5, 2014. On June 6, 2014, Lunneborg 
wrote an email to Brooke, Wilson, and OxyFresh Vice President Melissa Gulbranson on the 
subject "Final Version - Tom's Contract." In that email Lunneborg states: "I'm giving a copy to 
Edwards for them to see and one to an attorney to review on my behalf." (Defendants' Exh. A., 
p. 114). Lunneborg and Dan Edwards both testified that Lwmeborg did show Edwards the 
contract, and they both laughed about it, agreeing that if they signed it, it would be in direct conflict 
with Lwmeborg's Offer of Employment and job expectations at MFL. (Tr. p. 507). 
The record is largely silent on activity between the time this contract was presented to Dan 
Edwards, and when he was first contacted by Richard Brooke about it, July 15, 2014. Dan testified 
that during this time frame, he urged Lunneborg to prioritize product development, but during that 
time, Lunneborg chose to busy himself with other matters. (Tr. p. 562-567). Dan testified that 
while he had the ultimate say of "yes" to a product, Lunneborg had full rein, as he had said in his 
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email - "a white canvas that he and Todd [Dr. Schlapfer] could work off of. .. the sky's the limit. 
Let's build what product you want." (Tr. p. 567, L. 2-11). By the end of May, Lunneborg knew 
that receiving his $5,000 per month consulting fee from OxyFresh for June, July, and going 
forward was contingent on him NOT developing any nutritional product for MFL. 
On July 15, 2014, Brooke sent an email to Dan Edwards inquiring why he had not signed 
the Independent Contractor Agreement Lunneborg had presented to him, and asking him directly 
if he was currently "brainstorming, planning, or developing any nutritional products? Are they 
anything like Life Shatz or Vibe?" When do you plan to introduce them? Thanks." (Defendants ' 
Exh. A, p. 502). Dan did not immediately respond, but he told Lunneborg about the contact and 
asked him how he wanted him to reply. (Tr. p. 379, p. 3-9). Dan called Brooke, or vice versa, and 
they had a telephone conversation. During that conversation, which Carrie heard but did not 
participate in, Dan told Brooke that he did hire Lunneborg to develop nutrition and other health 
products for MFL. During that conversation, Brooke told Dan that Lunneborg was also an owner 
of Life Shatz, and told him Lunneborg had a contractual obligation and a responsibility not to build 
products based on the consulting arrangement. Dan told Brooke that if Lunneborg could not 
develop products for MFL, he would have to terminate him. (Tr. p. 518, L. 10-22). Dan reviewed 
Brooke's email to his team memorializing that conversation, and he confirmed that Brooke 
accurately summarized the substance of the conversation. (Defendants ' Exh. A., pp. 4-5; Tr. pp. 
513-520). 
On July 18, 2014, Lunneborg reported to Dan that "the poo has hit the fan" regarding his 
consulting ammgement with OxyFresh. (Defendants' Exh. A, p. 349; Tr. p. 389, L. 7-10). He 
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complained that Brooke seemed to think that all Lunneborg had been doing at MFL was product 
development. By July 2 l J 2014, Dr. Schlapfer and Lunneborg had a copy of Brooke's July 15, 
2014 email summarizing his conversation with Dan. On July 22, Dr. Sch.lapfer took the libe1iy of 
preparing a draft response for Lmmeborg to send as his own. This email draft emphasized that no 
health or nutritional product development had occuned at MFL, and any such activity would be 
"down the road." (Defendants' Exh. A. , pp. 206-208). At trial, Lunneborg testified he knew that 
this email response drafted by Dr. Schlapfer was not true. (Tr. p. 392, L. 7-25; p. 393, L. 1-4). 
At this point, July 22, 2014, both Dr. Schlapfer and Lunneborg must have known that 
Lunneborg' s consulting agreement with OxyFresh was in jeopardy, and/or his continued 
employment at MFL was in jeopardy. On that same day, Lunneborg sent Ca1Tie a message 
regarding a proposed revision of the compensation and price packages to go into effect on August 
1. Canie replied: 
Okay, let' s finalize and quit changing it. It's very costly to keep redoing everything. 
Then move on to adding other benefits ... The whole company was created on the 
idea of multiple products, and we keep taking our energy off growth to fix things. 
It's obvious we are losing momentum, and we can' t remain viable if we drop that 
many more members. 
(Tr. pp. 394-396). 
On July 24, 2017, Dan and Carrie Edwards had lunch with Dr. Schlapfer. They were 
frustrated by the lack of any progress in bringing health and nutritional products, and they were 
very concerned the continued non-compete negotiations and expectations, even though there was 
no written contract. They sought insight from Dr. Schlapfer. 
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Schlapfer clarified that Lunneborg's relationship with OxyFresh that was an obstacle. Dr. 
Schlapfer later that day sent a text to Lunneborg that stated 
he [m]ay have helped them see the wisdom of going retail vs. MLM. If we were to 
take that path, then we 'd need to determine which products we'd want to start with. 
Of course, this would best be figured out, envisioned, by talking and thinking it 
through. 
Defendants' Exh. A, p. 43 1. It was apparent that Lmmeborg was free, from Brooke's perspective, 
to develop products for MFL in a retail market. On July 24, 2014, after being told by Dr. Schlapfer 
that it may be possible to develop products on the retail front with MFL, Lunneborg finally got to 
work forwarding product development ideas to Dan Edwards. (Defendants' Exh. A. , pp. 429-431). 
After the lunch meeting with Dr. Schlapfer, Dan had come to the full realization that a 
conflict of interest with OxyFresh prevented Lmmeborg from developing products for MFL in the 
multilevel marketing context. He proposed to Lunneborg that they fo1m a retail company and he 
would employ him there. The following day, July 25, 2014, Dan met with Lunneborg and Dr. 
Schlapfer to discuss the same. (Tr. p. 604). Dan asked for Lunneborg's resignation based on the 
conflict of interest which prevented him from fulfilling all his job duties as COO of MFL. Dan 
could not continue to pay Lunneborg from MFL knowing that Lunneborg was prevented from 
developing products. Members, the lifeblood of MFL, had been told that Lunneborg was 
developing products for the company. Dan did not want to fire Lunneborg and leave him without 
a job, but he could not ethically justify employing him at MFL given the conflict of interest. Dan 
sketched out h ow quickly a new retail corporation could be created, and he even offered to pay 
Lunneborg a salary personally during the interim, to avoid having an employment relationship 
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with MFL tainted by conflict of interest. Lunneborg refused to quit his job without the retail 
company already in place. Lunneborg was asked to consider quitting OxyFresh, but he declined. 
(Tr. pp. 591-596; Tr. pp. 607-609). 
It was the very next day that Dr. Schlapfer made a note in his journal, dated July 26, 2017, 
alleging that Dan Edwards had asked him and Tom to make a "milTor image" of the Life Shotz 
product. (Plaintiffs Exh. 48, Tr. pp. 16-17). Dr. Schlapfer testified he thought it was impo1iant 
to make a note of this "for Tom's case," even though there was no lawsuit pending at the time, and 
Lunneborg had not yet been terminated. Id. Curiously, Dr. Schlapfer did not memorialize any of 
the other conversations related to the multiple non-compete discussions between OxyFresh, 
Lunneborg, Dan, or Dr. Schlapfer anywhere in his j ournal. Id. The very next day, July 27, 
Lunneborg memorialized a similar conversation by text to Dr. Schlapfer, stating that "Dan kind of 
lost his marbles with me last night. He round about asked me to knock off L.S. And then 
insinuated he could reverse engineer it." (Plaintiffs Exh. 30; Tr. p. 232-233). When asked about 
these statements, Dan Edwards testified he expressed at his lunch with Dr. Schlapfer that he wanted 
an energy drink developed, but he never requested a "minor image" of Life Shatz. (Tr. pp. 585-
588). 
Because Lunneborg refused to resign, on July 28, 20 14 Dan drafted the termination letter. 
Lunneborg took sick leave that day, so it was not delivered until the fo llowing day. Before he 
delivered the letter to Lunneborg, Dan repeated his offer to keep Lwmeborg employed with a retail 
company, but Dan required him to resign immediately until that company was formed. Lu1meborg 
again declined the offer, and he was tenninated. (Tr. 604-605). Lunneborg was rehired by 
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OxyFresh on July 31, 2014 as Vice President of Products and Development. He is still employed 
by that company in that capacity. He was demoted, because someone else had been hired to fill 
his previous position. (Plaintiffs Exh. 4 7, Tr. pp. 76-77). 
2. Piercing the Corporate Veil 
MFL was organized as a Delaware Corporation on Febrnary 22, 2013. Dan Edwards was 
its Chief Executive Officer, President, Secretary, and sole director. Dan Edwards was the owner 
of this corporation. (Tr. p. 51-52). Carrie Edwards was originally the Chief Administrative 
Officer. She briefly stepped into the role of Chief Operations Officer before Lmmeborg was hired, 
but after he was hired, her title was Executive Vice President. (Tr. p. 52). No questions were 
asked by counsel for Plaintiff concerning Carrie's actual job duties at MFL. 
In 2013-2014, MFL was doing well financially. (Tr. p. 55, L. 1-4). Since its roll out, the 
membership base was growing steadily, and it had revenues on the books of almost $3 million 
dollars. MFL earned commissions on the travel products it sold, but most of the revenues were 
generated through paid memberships in this multilevel marketing company. A membership 
purchased access to discounted travel benefits. Members were encouraged to recruit other 
members, and they were compensated for this through a plan that rewarded the higher-level 
members more generously. (Tr. pp. 56-58). The Edwards were the earliest members of this 
company, and their entire family recruited members in the first years of operations. (Tr. p. 117, 
L. I 0-23). As a result, they were compensated with commissions in accordance with the company 
plan that applied to all members of the company. Those commissions were properly reported for 
tax purposes on 1099 forms. (Tr. pp. 57-61; Plaintiffs Exhs 8-54). 
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In 2013 and early 2014, the Edwards owned several other businesses. They owned a 
tanning salon which they no longer own. The owned a company called Ink Drop Signs, and they 
owned another company called TraffiCorp. They also owned an LLC called Edventure, which at 
the time was purchasing the building that housed Ink Drop Signs, TraffiCorp, and MFL. (Tr. p. 
55). The three business entities shared rent and utility payments to Edventure, LLC, to pay the 
lease to own payments on the building. The building was ultimately purchased in 2015 . In 2014, 
MFL occupied the most space and it had the most personnel in the building. (Tr. pp. 84-85). In 
2013-2014, MFL paid rent and utilities for eight straight months. During this time frame, MFL 
was growing financially and with personnel. (Tr. p. 84-85). MFL also paid for some maintenance 
and renovations on the building in the amount of $64,944.48, because it needed to upgrade space 
for its operations. (Tr. p. 76). The staff had grown from four to twenty over the course of that 
year. (Tr. p. 127-130). No testimony was taken regarding the maintenance or rent payments made 
by other entities between 2013 and 2016. It is impossible on this record to determine whether 
MFL paid rent inequitably compared to the other entities from 2013 until MFL closed its doors in 
2016. 
During 2013 and 2014, the Edwards owned a 2014 Jeep and a 2014 Dodge Ram. The 
vehicles were titled in the Edwards ' names, but loan payments and vehicle maintenance were paid 
for by MFL for business related use of the vehicles. The vehicles were titled in the names of the 
Edwards personally because MFL could not qualify for credit when it first opened. (Tr. p. 70-72). 
Personal vehicle use charges for things like gasoline were coded accordingly and they were 
assigned as distributions to Dan Edwards. (Id.) Sh01ily before MFL declared bankruptcy those 
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vehicles were transferred to TraffiCorp. At that time, the loans on the vehicles were greater than 
the value. (Tr. p. 140). 
Carrie Edwards testified that the various entities lent each other funds when cash flow was 
an issue. These loans were noted as QuickBooks notes payable entries to be sure they were repaid. 
Carrie testified that one hundred percent of these obligations were repaid. (Tr. p. 75; p. 141-144). 
As MFL began losing members, and without products in development to attract new members, it 
began hemorrhaging money. TraffiCorp lent MFL a great deal of money in 2015-2016 to meet 
obligations such as payroll. When it became clear to Dan Edwards that MFL would have to declare 
bankruptcy, the Edwards' accountant advised them to do an asset sale from MFL to TraffiCorp 
rather than leave a note payable from an insolvent company on TraffiCorp books. TraffiCorp 
acquired the capital assets - furniture and equipment- from MFL, and paid full cash value without 
depreciating the assets to MFL. (Tr. pp. 93-94). 
Carrie testified that the businesses used just a couple of business credit cards to make 
purchases for all the companies. It was easier to manage the accounting, since the same people 
were making the purchases for all the corporations. All purchases made on these credit cards were 
downloaded into the Edwards' bookkeeping program, QuickBooks, and they were quickly coded 
by the bookkeeper to be sure those charges were paid by the appropriate business. If any personal 
expenses were made on the cards, those purchases were immediately coded as distributions to Dan 
Edwards. Carrie testified that the charges were allocated to the conect entity, or charged as a 
distribution, by checking the onEne credit card account every few days, and uploading that data to 
QuickBooks, and allowing the bookkeeper to code items correctly. Over the course of three years, 
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from 2013-2016, Dan Edwards received approximately $366,000 in distributions from MFL 
through these credit card charges. Those distributions were properly reported on the Edwards' tax 
returns. There was no commingling, because charges were coded to the correct entity as soon as 
they were made. All funds were properly traced out to the appropriate payor, and every billing 
statement was reconciled. (Tr. pp. 65-68; p. 92-96). No evidence was offered to challenge this 
testimony. 
In closing arguments, Lunneborg presented tlu·ough counsel an extrapolation of financial 
data that was not presented at trial, and therefore was not subject to cross examination or 
explanation by the Lmmeborg's witness Canie Edwards. This data purp01ied to show that for a 
snapshot in time in 2014, MFL was owed approximately $85,000 from loans made to other 
companies. This data was allegedly extrapolated from the Defendant's spreadsheets offered at 
trial. This "evidence" was offered for the first time in closing argument. There was no testimony 
from any witness concerning this calculation. Canie Edwards was not asked about it in her 
testin1ony. The District Comi relied on this extrapolation of data to support its piercing of the 
corporate veil analysis, arguing this was evidence of corporate malfeasance, that MFL was being 
looted by the Edwards' other companies. This was not fair closing argument, because it amounted 
to an offer of new demonstrative evidence that was not subject to proper evidentiary challenge 
during trial. Regardless, this snapshot of time did not and could not demonstrate that MFL was 
never repaid. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Did the District Comi commit legal error by failing to give deference to the employer in 
making the decision to terminate for just cause as is required by law, by substituti11g the 
Cami' s judgment on credibility for that of the employer, and thereby misapplying that law 
to the facts in this case? 
B. Did the District Cami commit legal error by misapplying the law of "piercing the corporate 
veil" to the facts, in considering financial transactions that did not prove unity of interest 
or intent to defraud creditors? 
C. Did the Dish·ict Cami commit legal error by misapplying the law of piercing the corporate 
veil as to Carrie Edwards, who was not a shareholder, and where no evidence was offered 
to show her control of that entity, and where she never consented under I.C. § 32-912 that 
her separate propeiiy could be used to pay community debt? 
D. Were the District Comt' s factual findings based on substantial and competent evidence? 
E. Did the District Court commit legal error by in awarding Plaintiff's attorneys' fees and 
costs of $167,028.69 plus post judgment interest? 
ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
When a trial comi serves as a fact finder, this Court applies an abuse of discretion standard. 
This Cami examines whether the trial court perceived the issues as one of discretion; acted within 
the bounds of that discretion; and reached its decision through that exercise of reason. Weitz v. 
Green, 148 Idaho 851,857,230 P.3d 743, 749 (2010), citing Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v. Idaho 
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Povver Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). The District Court' s findings are 
liberally construed in favor of the judgment, and factual findings will not be set aside unless they 
are clearly erroneous. Factual findings will be affirmed if suppo1ted by substantial and competent 
evidence, even if that evidence is conflicting. Weitz, 148 Idaho at 857, 230 P.3d at 749 (citations 
omitted). 
This Court, however, exercises free review over the lower coUit's conclusions of law to 
determine whether the comt conectly stated applicable law, and whether those conclusions are 
sustained by the facts found. Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352,356, 48 P.3d 1241, 
1245 (2002). In reviewing mixed questions of law and fact, this CoUit must differentiate between 
the fact-finding, law-stating, and law applying functions of the court below. This Court freely 
reviews a District Court's application oflaw to findings of fact. Sells v. Robinson, 141 Idaho 767, 
771, 118 P.3d 98, 103 (2005). 
B. The District Court Misapplied the Law by Substituting its judgment for that of the 
employer. 
This Co Ult has long recognized the duty of loyalty owed by an employee to their employer: 
Loyalty to his trust is the first duty which an agent owes to his principal. It follows 
as a necessary conclusion that the agent must not put himself in such a relationship 
that his interests become antagonistic to those of his principal. Fidelity in the agent 
is what is aimed at, and as a means of securing it the law will not pem1it the agent 
to place himself in a situation in which he may be tempted by his own private 
interest to disregard that of his principal. So it is the duty of the agent to make his 
principal a full and complete disclosure of all facts relative to the subject of his 
agency which it may be material to the principal to know. 
Jensen v. Sidney Stevens Implement Co., 36 Idaho 348,353,210 P. 1003, 1005 (1922). 
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Idaho law is not well developed in the analysis of termination for cause. There is a case, 
Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co. , 116 Idaho 622, 630, 778 P.2d 744, 752 (1989), which states 
that "where good cause is required, the employer must show that the employee did something 
wrong that justified the termination." That case was not decided on termination for cause grounds; 
rather, in Metca(f, this Court first recognized an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in 
employment contracts. 
The law of other jurisdictions is instructive, but the law as analyzed by the District Court 
paints an incomplete picture of the appropriate analysis to apply. Although it is true that the Cou1is 
must apply some reasonable and objective standards to review an employer's decision to te1minate 
for cause, the courts are not authorized to second guess an employer. The standard is rather like 
the one this Cami is to give findings of fact reached by a lower court. So long as the decision 
making was based on substantial evidence and the conclusion was reasonable, the cou1is should 
affinn the decision to terminate for cause. As one comi stated, the question for the comis in 
reviewing such employment decisions is not whether misconduct occuned, but rather whether the 
employer had reasonable grounds to believe it did. So long as the conclusions are reached honestly 
after an appropriate investigation and for reasons that were not arbitrary or pretextual, the 
employer's decision should be affirmed. Cofran v. Rollins Hudig Hall, International, Inc., 17 Cal. 
4th 93, 948 P.2d 412 (1998). In that case, an employer terminated based on allegations of sexual 
harassment. The California comi held the jury should not be instructed that they must find the 
harassment occurred, but rather they should be instructed to detennine whether the employer's 
beliefthat it did was reasonable . Cofran, 17 Cal. 4th at 95, 948 P.2d at 414. 
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Similarly, in Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or. 96, 643 P.2d 1276 (1982) (en 
bane), the court held that an employer's judgment should receive deference from the courts where 
there are disputed allegations of misconduct, so long as the employer's decision was based on 
substantial evidence and was made in good faith. The Simpson decision was cited with approval 
in Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in Washington, Inc. , 112 Wash.2d 127, 769 P.2d 298 (1989) 
(en bane), the decision relied upon by the District Court. The District Court, however, cited 
Baldwin for the proposition that the court could substitute its judgment of "reasonable" for the 
employer's judgment. The Baldwin decision was much more deferential to the employer than the 
DistTict Court recognized. The Baldwin comi stated: 
Similarly, an employer' s agreement to restrict discharges to those suppo1ied by just 
cause should not be followed by a further judicial implication which takes the 
determination of just cause away from the employer. 
Baldwin, 112 Wasb.2d at 138, 769 P.2d at 304. 
The burden of proof for Lunneborg to show that Dan Edwards' decision to terminate was 
pretextual was not stated by the District Comi in its analysis. This Comi has held that proof of 
pretext requires proof that the employer's profen-ed intent was inconsistent or unbelievable. 
Frogley v. Meridian School District, 155 Idaho 558, 566,314 P.3d 613,621 (2013). It isn' t enough 
to simply throw out an alternate potential motive. The plaintiff must prove that the reasons given 
by the employer were not consistent or believable. "Courts only require an employer honestly 
believe its reason for its actions, even if its reason is foolish or trivial or even baseless." Id., 
quoting Villiarmo v. Aloha Island Air, 281 F.3d 1054, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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The District Comi in the instant case found that Dan Edwards' decision lacked any 
evidence at all to support it, and it was unreasonable, because Dan took Brooke and Dr. Schlapfer's 
word over Lunneborg' s. (Memorandum Decision, pp. 16-17). Just as when this comt reviews a 
trial court or jury decision, the law of tennination for cause required the District Court instead to 
consider whether the information Brooke and Dr. Schlapfer provided to Dan Edwards constituted 
substantial evidence of cause to terminate, and if it did, whether it was reasonable to rely on it. 
The District Court accepted Lunneborg's invitation to believe his version of events over everyone 
else's. Lunneborg said he was not negotiating and would not sign a non-compete contract with 
Brooke. Brooke said he was, and that a verbal agreement had already been reached, and that the 
consulting and advising relationship Lunneborg enjoyed with OxyFresh depended on that 
agreement. Dr. Schlapfer confirmed to Dan that Brooke would never allow Lunneborg to bring 
products to market for MFL as a multilevel marketing company while he was associated with 
OxyFresh. 
Dan did not immediately terminate Lunneborg after speaking with Brooke on July 15, 
20 14. Instead, he tried to determine if Lunneborg was willing to develop products through 
discussions and prodding. Lunneborg continued to stall. Dan had a conversation with Dr. 
Schlapfer that confim1ed both his experience with Lunneborg, and what Brooke had told him. It 
was at that point that Dan acted. By July 24, 2014, Dan Edwards had more than ample grounds to 
conclude that Lunneborg had a conflict of interest created by his continued affiliation with 
OxyFresh, and that conflict prevented him from fulfilling a central purpose of his employment 
agreement. He had ample reason to believe that Lunneborg was negotiating an Independent 
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Contractor Agreement with OxyFresh that would preclude his product development for MFL. The 
Idaho courts should affirm that decision. 
The District Comi fmiher found Dan's decision to be unreasonable because bringing 
products to market was only one paii of Lunneborg's job and it was not a "central purpose" of the 
job, and Lunneborg could not be expected to bring products to market by himselfin the two months 
he was employed. The record is clear that Dan did not fire Lunneborg because he did not bring 
products to market in the two months he was hired. Dan testified that he knew products took time 
to develop; he was willing to give Lunneborg that time and all the resources he needed. But 
Lunneborg was expected to bring ideas and evaluate them for Dan. Lunneborg himself testified 
that he knew product development was a central purpose of his employment as COO of MFL, 
and it was cleat· error for the District Court to find otherwise. (Tr. p. 271, L. 7-10). It was 
Lunneborg 's own testimony that Dan had promised him ample time and resources to develop 
products. (Defendants' Exh. A., p. 104 (emphasis added); (Tr. p. 166, L. 15-25; p. 167, L. 1-16). 
There was no contrary evidence presented. There was no substantial or competent evidence to 
support the findings that product development was not a central purpose to the COO job, or that 
Dan expected a product roll out in two months' time. Dan fired Lunneborg because it was clear 
that he would never be able to fulfill this central purpose while he was affiliated with OxyFresh, 
and Lunneborg was not willing to relinquish that relationship. This decision was reasonable under 
the circumstances, and it was supported by substantial evidence. 
Lunneborg's suggestion, and the District Court's finding, that Dan Edwards was motivated 
to fire Lunneborg because he refused to reverse engineer Life Shotz does not meet the burden of 
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proof on pretext. Even if the District Court believes the story of Lunneborg and his pal Dr. 
Sch.lapfer, a story told for the very first time when they both realized what Dan knew and that 
Lmmeborg's job was in jeopardy, that story is not enough to prove that Dan Edwards did not have 
legitimate grounds to terminate Lunneborg for cause. The law requires proof that Dan Edwards 
did not believe he had grounds to terminate, or that his grounds given were not believable; the 
burden of proof is not met by facts suggesting an alternate motive. Frogley v. Meridian School 
District, 155 Idaho 558,566,3 14 P.3d 613,621 (2013). 
The District Court misapplied the law to the facts of this case, and this Comi must reverse. 
Applying the law conectly, Dan Edwards acted well within reason to rely on the info1mation he 
received from his chief competitor and former employer of Lunneborg, Richard Brooke, a man 
Dan trusted professionally. He was well within reason to check that story out with Lunneborg's 
good friend and product development collaborator, to determine ultimately that Lunneborg had an 
untenable conflict of interest, he hadn 't been completely forthright with either OxyFresh or MFL 
about this conflict, and he should be fired for cause. Because his reasons for termination are 
backed by substantial evidence reasonably relied upon, and there is no evidence to suggest Dan 
did not believe he had good cause to terminate, there could be no finding of pretext. This Court 
must reverse the District Comt's misapplication of the law, which relied in pmi on findings of facts 
made in clear error, and grant final judgment on this issue in favor of Dan Edwards. 
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C. The District Court Misapplied the Law in its "piercing the corporate veil" 
analysis by considering factors that did not prove unity of interest or fraudulent 
intent. 
The Comis do not disregard the legal protections created for corporate entities lightly. To 
invoke the equitable remedy to pierce the corporate veil, there must be proof of 1) unity of interest 
and owners~ip to a degree that the separate personalities of the corporation and individual do not 
exist; and 2) if the acts are treated as acts of the corporation, a fraudulent or inequitable result will 
follow: Wander Trails, LLC v. Big Bite Excavation, Inc. , 156 Idaho 586, 594, 329 P.3d 368, 376 
(2014); Baker v. Kulczyk, 112 Idaho 417, 732 P.2d 386 (1987). The mere fact of a company's 
insolvency is not evidence of an inequitable result and it is not enough by itself to pierce the 
corporate veil. Baker v. Kulczyk, supra. 
The District Cowi, relying on the arguments of Plaintiffs counsel, stated that proof of 
"only one factor" in the laundry lists of factors comis consider making this detennination is 
sufficient to pierce the corporate veil. (Memorandum Decision, pp. 31-32). That is an inaccurate 
statement of law. Piercing the corporate veil is a disfavored remedy. As one court recently noted, 
"[b ]ecause piercing the veil takes the extreme step of disregarding the formal structure of the 
corporation, there is a strong presumption against imposing such liability." In re Gigliotti, 507 
B.R. 826 (United States Bankruptcy Comi, E.D. PA 2014). See also Am. Bell, Inc. v. Fed 'n ofTel. 
Workers of Pa., 736 F.2d 879, 886 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting that piercing the corporate veil requires 
a finding of specific, unusual circumstances). 
Not every disregard of corporate fo1malities or failure to maintain corporate records 
justifies piercing the corporate veil. The remedy is available only if it is also shown that a 
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corporation's affairs and personnel were manipulated to such an extent that it became nothing 
more than a sham used to disguise the alter ego's use of its assets for his own benefit in fraud of 
its creditors. In sh01t, the evidence must show that the corporation' s owners abused the legal 
separation of a corporation from its owners and used the corporation for illegitimate purposes. In 
re Blatstein, 192 F.3d 88, 100 (3d Cir. 1999) ( citations omitted). 
The Supreme Comt of Utah has noted that in the alter ego theory analysis, the courts must 
balance piercing the veil against insulating policies, and will only reluctantly and cautiously pierce 
the corporate veil. Jones v. Trevor Jvfarketing, Inc. v. Lowry, 284 P.3d 630 (2012). The Supreme 
Cou1t of Utah also explained that while no factor of the analysis is determinative and proof of one 
factor could be enough to survive summary judgment in the right case, the factors considered by 
the courts in this analysis should not be considered elements of the claim. They are factors to be 
considered in determining whether the elements have been met. Jones, 284 P.3d at 637-638 . 
The Utah comt additionally held that mere allegations that corporate funds were withdrawn 
by shareholders would not survive summary judgment without proof that the withdrawals were 
not legitimate, and proper accounting was not done. The Supreme Comt held that because the 
party alleging liability based on an alter ego theory bears the burden of proof, they also have the 
burden to prove that corporate funds were used illegitimately, or were not accounted for 
appropriately. Jones, 284 P.3d at 639, citing William Meade Fletcher, et al. , Fletcher Cyclopedia 
of Corporations,§ 41.28 (2006). 
The District Court erred in its articulation of the law, and its application of law to the facts 
of this case. First, the District Court found that lack of corporate formalities observed by MFL 
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could pierce the veil. Although MFL did not observe corporate formalities by drafting corporate 
resolutions, the evidence is undisputed that there was only one ultimate decision maker for MFL: 
Dan Edwards. He was accountable only to himself in this corporation decision making. It is not 
unusual for closely held businesses to operate this way, and from an exposure standpoint the 
resolutions should have been done. But there has been no showing that the lack of formalities 
observed was intended to defraud anyone or hide nebulous behavior. 
The District Comi found that there was "commingling," because the corporate entities 
loaned each other money over the years. Can-ie Edwards testified that all this money was repaid 
between the corporate entities, she explained how this was accomplished through the bookkeeping 
system, and this evidence was not challenged or rebutted while she testified. After the trial closed, 
Lunneborg's attorneys argued in closing briefs that in 2014, MFL was owed money by other 
corporations that had not been repaid. Notwithstanding the procedural tmfairness of presenting 
demonstrative evidence in closing argument, this allegation fails to meet Lunneborg's burden of 
proof for the same reasons the plaintiff failed in the Jones case, above. Lunneborg presented a 
snap shot of loans made between the corporations while the evidence is undisputed that MFL was 
doing well financially, it had almost $3 million dollars in the bank at the time. Can-ie Edwards 
testified in detail as to the accounting system maintained by QuickBooks to ensure that notes 
payable between the corporations were all reconciled. She testified that all loans were repaid and 
reconciled. Lunneborg offered no evidence or even cross exan1 to rebut that evidence. Lunneborg 
is unable to say that the funds were never repaid to MFL. In fact, the evidence is on this record is 
that by 2015 and 2016, MFL was in significant debt to TraffiCorp. Without a full examination of 
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the funds lent between the organizations from 2013-2016, Lunneborg is not able to show that funds 
were lent by MFL for improper purposes, or that funds were not properly repaid, or that accounting 
procedures were not followed. 
The District Comi held that the fact that the Edwards took money out of the corporation in 
the form of conm1issions related to their membership in the multilevel marketing company, and 
that Dan Edwards took distributions through use of credit cards for personal use, represented 
evidence of commingling or unity. Unless Lunneborg can show that either of these were illegal 
or improper, or that proper accounting procedures were not used, these facts are irrelevant to the 
analysis. The Edwards were compensated as members in MFL because they recruited other 
members. Every time these new members recruited downstream, the Edwards earned 
commissions. So did every other member who joined the company. That was the business plan 
from the beginning. These commissions were properly reported on taxes, and Lunneborg has no 
evidence to the contrary. He has failed to meet his burden of proof on this issue. 
Regarding the distributions, Canie Edwards testified at length that the credit card charges 
were downloaded every few days and properly coded to the appropriate account for the correct 
company to pay, or as a distribution to Dan. These distributions were properly reported for tax 
purposes. Lunneborg has failed to show these payments were illegal or improper, or that proper 
accounting procedures were not followed. 
The District Court held that the fact that the Edwards allowed MFL to pay automobile 
expenses for cars titled in their names was evidence of commingling. This was in error. The 
Internal Revenue Service expressly permits this anangement with proper accounting procedures 
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in place. See IRS Publication 463: https://www.irs .gov/pub/irs-pdD'p463.pdf Carrie Edwards 
testified that business and personal automobile expenses were segregated in the accounting 
procedures. It is Lunneborg' s burden to prove proper accounting procedures were not in place, 
and he has not made that showing. 
The District Court held that the fact that TraffiCorp purchased the assets of MFL as it was 
closing its doors was evidence to supp01i veil piercing. The evidence presented by Carrie Edwards 
was that TraffiCorp lent significant funds to MFL to keep that company going as memberships 
declined. When it was clear MFL was not going to be able to repay that debt, TraffiCorp decided 
to purchase the assets at full value, not depreciated, rather than leave those assets in MFL with a 
note payable that would never be repaid. It was a way for TraffiCorp to get some value out of its 
lending relationship to MFL. This was done on an accountant's advice. Again, unless Lunneborg 
can show this was an illegal or improper transfer, or that accounting procedures were not followed, 
Lunneborg has failed to meet his burden of proof on this issue. 
The District Court held that the fact that MFL paid rent and utilities to the Edwards' real 
estate holding company, Edventure LLC, was evidence of comingling or improper self -dealing. 
The District Cami also held that because in 2013-2014, MFL paid more rent than other entities, 
somehow this was evidence of financial malfeasance. It is a common corporate structure, and 
perfectly lawful, to hold real estate through a limited liability company. It provides corporate 
liability protections with pass through income taxation. Carrie Edwards testified that the rent 
collected from all the various entities was used to purchase the building. Without a full analysis 
of all the rent paid by all the entities between 2013 - 2016, it is impossible to conclude that MFL 
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paid more than its fair share. MFL was the largest entity, personnel wise, of all the corporations, 
and in 2013-2014, it was enjoying steady growth. It had to invest in building renovations to 
accommodate its business needs. Lunneborg did not meet his burden of proof to show that this 
arrangement was an improper self-dealing transaction intended to defraud creditors. 
Finally, although the District Comt recognized that MFL was sufficiently capitalized in 
2014, and despite also finding that bankruptcy alone is insufficient to pierce the corporate veil, the 
District Court nonetheless considered the bankruptcy in its piercing the veil analysis by holding 
that the Edwards ultin1ately depleted the corporation. Lunneborg did not meet his burden of proof 
of demonstrating that the Edwards depleted MFL and caused the bankruptcy tlu·ough nefarious 
financial transactions. Carrie Edwards testified that by the end of 2014, memberships were 
declining. Lunneborg testified that he was aware that if MFL was not able to bring new products 
to market, or offer new products to members, membership would decline, and the company could 
fail. It was Lunneborg 's burden of proof and persuasion to connect the dots, by proving and not 
just saying that the Edwards did something nefarious to deplete the assets of MFL and cause 
bankruptcy. 
In summary, the District Court misstated the law of piercing the corporate veil, and 
misapplied the law to the facts. The multi-factor legal analysis for piercing the corporate veil is 
not intended to be a "check the box" analysis. Someone seeking to pierce the corporate veil must 
prove that financial transactions were improper, illegal, and/or failed to follow accounting 
procedmes before a comt can conclude they evidence commingling, self-dealing, unity of interest 
or intent to defraud. Transactions that are, on their face, legal business transactions cannot 
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evidence commingling, self-dealing, or intent to evade creditors without some additional showing 
of impropriety. Lunneborg failed to meet his burden of proof to pierce the veil and reach the 
personal assets of Dan Edwards and this Court should reverse that judgment. 
D. The District Court committed legal error by extending Idaho law to permit piercing 
of the corporate veil to reach personal and separate property of the spouse who was not an 
owner of the corporation. 
For all the reasons argued above, Lunneborg cannot pierce the corporate veil to reach the 
assets of Carrie Edwards. Lunneborg cannot reach Canie's personal assets or separate property, 
because she never agreed that such property could be reached under I.C. § 32-912. The District 
Comi found that the veil could be pierced for her because she received the benefit of alleged 
corporate financial malfeasance. Carrie does not disagree that some coU1ts have held that non-
owners of a corporate entity can have their personal assets reached through the alter-ego theory. 
In all such cases, however, including virtually all the cases cited by the District Court, there was a 
finding that the individual had ultimate control of the entity and therefore had unity of interest. 
For example, in Swenson v. Bushman Investment Properties, Ltd. , 870 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1059 (D. 
Idaho 2012), the Cami held that non-shareholders might be liable under an alter ego theory if they 
were paii of ai1 insider group that controlled the entity. (emphasis added). If someone does not 
own a company, logic dictates that before that person can be personally liable for corporate debt, 
there must be some showing that they were personally responsible, as a decision maker, for 
diversion of corporate funds from creditors. 
In this case, the record is si lent as to Carrie's role in MFL, besides her titles. She was 
called as Lunneborg's witness in his case in chief because of her personal knowledge of the 
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accounting systems of all the businesses, but no questions were asked of her or of Dan about her 
job duties or responsibilities, or whether she made any of the financial or other decisions at issue. 
She testified about her knowledge of the transactions and the bookkeeping practices of the 
companies, and the reasons for some of the accounting decisions. She was asked nothing else. 
The CoUJi found that Carrie "moved the money around," but that finding was not based on 
substantial or competent evidence. No questions were asked of Carrie to demonstrate that she was 
the one who moved the money around, between corporations, or otherwise. 
In Buckley v. Abuzir, 300 Ill. Dec. 624, 636, 8 N.E.3d 1166, 1177-1178 (Ill. Ct. App.2014), 
relied on by the District Court, the plaintiff alleged that the non-owner defendant was the "sole 
governing and dominating personality of the business enterprise," that the defendant funded the 
corporation, and that the defendant "made all of the business decisions" and "exercised ownership 
control over the enterprise." Buckley, 300 Ill. Dec. at 629, 8 N.E.3d at 1171. Those allegations, 
together with allegations that showed intent to defraud, were deemed sufficient to survive a motion 
to dismiss. In virtually all the cases cited by Buckley throughout the country where the corporate 
veil was pierced for a non-owner, it was based on findings that the non-owner exercised financial 
and decision-making control over the corporation sufficient to be deemed the "equitable owner." 
Buckley, 300 Ill. Dec. at 630-636; 8 N.E.3d at 1172-1178. 
The Illinois comis recognize that a showing of control by a non-owner is necessary to 
establish the "unity of interest" prong for piercing the corporate veil. See Fontana v. TLD Builders, 
Inc. 362 11.. App. 3d 491 , 840 N.E.2d 767 (2005); Macaluso v. Jenkins, 95 Ill. App. 3d 461, 465-
66, (198 1) (emphasis added). In Fontana, the evidence established that the President of that 
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company, while not an owner, made all the financial decisions including financial transactions for 
his own personal benefit without adequate accounting procedures in place to explain them. 
Fontana, 362 IL App. 3d at 502-503, 840 N.E.2d at 772-779. In Macaluso, a director was held 
liable tmder an alter ego theory because the evidence established that he made most or all decisions 
concerning the corporation; he was the sole representative for negotiating contracts; he had power 
to authorize loans to the corporation; he had authority to appoint vice presidents without holding 
elections or consulting the Board; he treated the corporate accotmts like a personal account; and 
he engaged in self-dealing. 95 III. App. At 465-466, 420 N.E.2d at 255-256. Notably, in Macaluso, 
a secretary for the corporation was not held personally liable, where all she did was ca1Ty out the 
financial directions of the director. 95 Ill. App. At 467-469, 420 N.E.2d at 257-258. 
To the extent Lunneborg seeks to make Carrie responsible personally because she enjoyed 
the fruits of MFL's alleged corporate malfeasance, that as a matter of law cannot be sufficient to 
pierce the veil. No court anywhere in the country has held that personal assets of a spouse can be 
reached by creditors of the other spouse' s company, just because funds from that company were 
shared with the community. This would turn corporate law on its head and remove all legal 
protections for the spouse of a corporate owner, and it would violate LC. § 32-912 on its face. 
There must be some showing of Carrie's decision making, control, and true unity of interests with 
the corporation before this Court extends the law of piercing the corporate veil beyond its intended 
pmposes. This is not the case for this Court to extend the reach of its piercing the corporate veil 
analysis. This record does not support such a holding. This Court must reverse the ruling that 
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Carrie is personally liable under an alter ego theory for the debts of MFL and enter final judgment 
against Lunneborg on this issue. 
E. The District Court committed legal error in its award of Lunneborg's Attorney's Fees 
and Costs. 
This Court applies an abuse of discretion standard to review a fee award. Burns v. Cly of 
Boundary, 120 Idaho 623,625,818 P.2d 327, 329 (Ct. App. 1990). Under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3), the 
comts must balance the time and labor required; the novelty and difficulty of the questions; the 
skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience and ability of the attorney 
in the paiticular field of law; the prevailing charges for like work; whether the fee is fixed or 
contingent; the amount involved and the results obtained; the undesirability of the case; the nature 
and length of the professional relationship with the client; awards in similar cases; the reasonable 
costs of automated legal research; and any other factor deemed appropriate. 
Lunneborg' s attorneys, in a contingency fee arrangement case, invested five attorneys and 
1048 hours in this case. The District Court agreed that this amount of time and labor invested in 
a relatively uncomplicated dispute that resulted in a three-day trial shocked his conscience. The 
Court's conscience, however, was only shocked by ten percent, and some shaving of an hourly 
rate. This Comt should reverse the judgments of the District Comt in its entirety, which will render 
the Edwards the prevailing party, and moot out this attorneys' fees ai·gument. If this Court does 
not reverse, this Court should examine this fee award remand it as an abuse of discretion. 
In justifying the fee award, the District Court found that the hours invested were 
necessitated by the Defendant's conduct of discovery abuses and filing bankruptcy. This was an 
abuse of discretion. The fees associated with the discovery abuses were litigated and determined 
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to be worth $8,823.75. That is the proper value to place on that dispute, and to permit padding of 
the remaining bill on that basis amounts to double counting. To the extent the District Comi has 
punished the Edwards for filing bankruptcy with this attorneys' fee award, there is 110 evidence 011 
this record, as noted above, that bankruptcy was filed for any improper purpose. The attorneys' 
fees are excessive, and the Court' s judgment on them was an abuse of discretion for failure to 
conduct a proper analysis . This Comi should reverse and remand with instructions to make an 
appropriate finding that does not inflate the final bill due to a discovery dispute that has already 
been valued; and which does not punish the defendants for filing of bankruptcy without proof of 
improper purpose. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Comi committed legal errors in its analysis of the breach of contract claim and 
piercing the corporate veil. The District Court's attorneys' fee analysis evidence a desire to punish 
the Defendants for alleged malfeasance, even though there was no malfeasance shown on this 
record. This Court should reverse the decisions, and find that MFL and the Edwards are not liable 
to Lun11eborg, and grant any other relief deemed appropriate. 
Dated this 24th day of November 2017. 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
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CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT 
Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THOMAS LUNNEBORG, a married 
Individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
MY FUN LIFE CORP., a Delaware ) 
corporation, DAN E. EDWARDS and ) 
CARRIE L. EDWARDS, husband and wife, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
--------------
Case No. CV 2014 8968 
MEMORANDUM DECISION, 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
ORDER FOLLOWING COURT TRIAL 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND. 
This matter came before the Court on March 13-15, 2017, for a three-day court 
trial. Following the trial, the parties were allowed to submit simultaneous post-trial 
briefing on March 29, 2017, and allowed to submit simultaneous rebuttal briefing to their 
opponent's post-trial brief on April 5, 2017. The parties submitted such briefing. The 
matter is now at issue. 
On December 8, 2014, Plaintiff Thomas Lunneborg (Lunneborg) filed his 
Complaint against My Fun Life Corp. (MFL). Lunneborg's Complaint alleged; 1) MFL 
terminated Lunneborg's employment without cause, 2) MFL breached its contract, 
3) MFL violated the Idaho Wage Claim Act, I.C. § 45-601 et. seq., 3) MFL wrongfully 
terminated Lunneborg in violation of public policy, and 4) MFL breached its duty of good 
faith and fair dealing. Campi. 1-9. On January 5, 2015, MFL filed its Answer and 
Counterclaim. MFL generally denied most of Lunneborg's claims, affirmatively 
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defended, claiming Lunneborg's agreement with MFL lacked consideration. MFL also 
counterclaimed against Lunneborg, claiming that Lunneborg fraudulently induced MFL 
to enter into the employment contract with Lunneborg, Lunneborg breached the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and Lunneborg was unjustly enriched by his 
being paid his salary when he didn't do what he was supposed to do. Answer and 
Counterclaim, 1-16. 
On February 19, 2015, this Court scheduled the court trial to begin February 18, 
2016. On August 7, 2015, the parties filed a Joint Motion and Order for Trial 
Continuance, and on August 9, 2015, this Court rescheduled the trial to begin on 
June 13, 2016. 
On September 8, 2015, Lunneborg filed a Motion for Leave to File First 
Amended Complaint, which sought to add Dan Edwards and Carrie Edwards as 
defendants, alleging MFL was used by them as an alter ego. Mem. Supp. Mot. leave 
File First Am. Compl. 3. On September 25, 2015, MFL filed its Statement of Non-:-
Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint. After a hearing on 
December 8, 2015, this Court entered its Order Granting Leave to File First Amended 
Complaint. The First Amended Complaint was filed December 21 , 2015. On February 
16, 2016, defendants MFL and Dan and Carrie Edwards filed an Answer to First 
Amended Complaint. This pleading did not contain any affirmative defense or 
counterclaims by any of the defendants. 
On March 8, 2016, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Trial Continuance and on 
March 8, 2016, this Court rescheduled the court trial for October 17, 2016. 
On June 22, 2016, a Notice of Bankruptcy was filed, informing this Court that 
MFL had that same day filed for Chapter 7 protection under the United States 
Bankruptcy Code. Due to that filing, on September 27, 2016, Lunneborg filed Plaintiff's 
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Motion to Reset Trial Date. Following a hearing on October 11 , 2016, this court 
rescheduled the Court trial to begin on March 13, 2017. 
This is an employment contract dispute. The contract was an April 8, 2014, 
Offer of Employment signed by both Lunneborg and Dan Edwards. Pl.'s Ex. 138; Defs' 
Exh. A, p. 341. That contract states in pertinent part: "Your employment with the 
Company will be at will ; meaning that either you or the Company will be entitled to 
terminate your employment at any time and for any reason , with or without cause." Pl.'s 
Ex. 138, p. 1, ,t 4; Defs' Exh. A, p. 341, ,r 4. It also states: "In the event of termination 
of this employment agreement, without cause, except resignation, six months of salary 
will be paid on current payroll schedule." Id., ,r 5. 
On May 21, 2014, Lunneborg went to work as Chief Operating Officer of MFL, a 
Deleware corporation owned by Dan and Carrie Edwards. MFL is a multi-level 
marketing company. At the time, MFL sold memberships for access to discount travel 
accommodations. Just over two months after Lunneborg's first day of work, on July 29, 
2014, Dan Edwards terminated Lunneborg's employment. Defs' Ex. A, p. 500. 
The dispute centers around whether Lunneborg is entitled to receive his six 
months' termination pay, which amounts to $60,000.00. Under the terms of the Offer of 
Employment, which both Dan Edwards and Lunneborg signed on April 16, 2014, if 
Lunneborg was terminated by defendants "without cause", then Lunneborg is entitled to 
his termination pay from MFL. Pl. 's Ex. 138. If Lunneborg is entitled to his termination 
pay from MFL, secondary issues arise as to whether that amount should be trebled 
under I.C. § 45-615, and whether Lunneborg should be allowed to "pierce the corporate 
veil" of MFL, and obtain judgment against Dan and Carrie Edwards. MFL has no 
assets. 
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II. ANALYSIS. 
A. Lunneborg Was Terminated Without Cause. 
1. The Law. 
"Where good cause is required, the employer must show that the employee did 
something wrong that justified the termination." Metcalf v. lntermountain Gas Co., 116 
Idaho 622, 630, 778 P.2d 744, 752 (1989). In order for Dan Edwards and Carrie 
Edwards to defend that Lunneborg's termination was with cause, their discharge of 
Lunneborg must be objectively reasonable. 
The employer is not the sole judge of what constitutes good cause. 
The employ~r's mere dissatisfaction with the employee's performance, or 
the mere absence of bad faith or evil or fraudulent conduct on his or her 
part, does not necessarily constitute good cause. Good cause exists only 
where a discharge is objectively reasonable, in that a reasonable person · 
would find the cause sufficient. 
30 C.J.S. Employer - Employee § 70 (footnotes omitted). As set forth below, this Court 
finds Dan Edwards and Carrie Edwards lacked a reasonable basis for discharging 
Lunneborg. 
In the absence of a contract provision to the contrary, the employer 
determines the facts in deciding whether good cause for discharge exists, 
and may act on its findings if they are supported by substantial evidence. 
The employer must believe the evidence, and its belief must be 
reasonable. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). There is "no contract provision to the contrary" in the present 
case. One of the cases cited in the above passage is Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence 
in Washington, Inc., 112 Wash.2d 127, 769 P.2d 298 (1989 en bane). In Baldwin, the 
Supreme Court of Washington held: 
We hold "just cause" is a fair and honest cause or reason, 
regulated by good faith on the part of the party exercising the power. We 
further hold a discharge for "just cause" is one which is not for any 
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal reason and which is one based on facts (1) 
supported by substantial evidence and (2) reasonably believed to be true. 
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112 Wash.2d at 139, 769 P.2d at 304. As set forth below, this Court finds the reasons 
stated by Dan Edwards for firing Lunneborg were false. Those reasons were not at the 
time and are not now supported by substantial evidence. This Court finds that even if 
Dan Edwards believed in the truth of those reasons, such belief was not reasonable. 
There was testimony at trial that Lunneborg felt that "without cause" in his 
agreement meant any firing had to be for "something intentional" such as sexual 
misconduct. Lunneborg testified that the original draft of the agreement provided six-
months salary if he were to be discharged for any reason. Pl's Ex. 13A. Lunneborg 
testified Dan Edwards requested it be changed to "without cause", and told Lunneborg 
the reason for the request was Dan Edwards did not want to pay six months' salary if 
Lunneborg was discharged for intentional conduct such as sexual misconduct, 
committing a crime, or taking information from MFL. Dan Edwards testified that was not 
the case and that he told Lunneborg if he had to terminate Lunneborg for not doing his 
job, that would not be "without cause." The Court finds it does not need to decide who 
is telling the truth. This Court finds that under the common meaning of "without cause", 
Dan Edwards fired Lunneborg "without cause." 
2. The Facts. 
Lunneborg had worked for Oxyfresh for almost 20 years. When he left Oxyfresh 
to join MFL, Lunneborg was Vice President of Logistics and Product Development. 
Dan Edwards was put in contact with Lunneborg through Dr. Todd Schlapfer 
(Schlapfer), a naturopath who had previously helped Lunneborg with research and 
development at Oxyfresh. Dan Edwards had known Schlapfer for quite some time as 
Dan Edwards testified Schlapfer had treated Dan Edwards, Carrie Edwards and Dan 
Edwards' mother, who passed away in 2004, Dan Edwards testified he and Schlapfer 
frequently had lunch together. Dan Edwards testified that it was Schlapfer who asked 
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Dan Edwards to talk to Lunneborg. Citing Rosecrans v. lntermountain Soap and 
Chemical Co., Inc. , 100 Idaho 785, 605 P.2d 963 (1980), defendants argue Lunnegborg 
has the burden to establish he was terminated in violation of the employment contract, 
and then, the burden shifts to defendants to prove the existence of good cause for the 
termination. Defendants' Closing Argument Reply Brief 1-2. The Court finds 
Lunneborg has met his burden of proving he was terminated in violation of the 
employment contract. The Court also finds defendants have not proven good cause. 
Stated conversely, Lunneborg has proven that he was terminated without cause. 
Lunneborg had known Schlapfer through working with Schlapfer at Oxyfresh. 
Together they developed products for Oxyfresh. One of those products was LifeShotz, 
a nutritional supplement. Dan Edwards knew Schlapfer through Schlapfer's profession 
as a naturopath. 
Richard Brooke (Brooke) owns Oxyfresh. Dan Edwards testified at trial in the 
defense case in chief that he knows Brooke very well. Dan Edwards testified that 
"Brooke and I have known each other for many years," "We were going to do business 
together but he didn't put me on top." Dan Edwards testified, "I value Richard, I trust 
the man, he is a legend in network marketing." 
Schlapfer knew Dan Edwards was looking for an executive-level employee to run 
MFL, and Schlapfer knew that Lunneborg had concerns about continuing to work for 
Oxyfresh. On March 27, 2013, Dan and Carrie Edwards, Lunneborg and Schlapfer met 
at the Coeur d'Alene Resort Golf Course cafe. That led to a dinner two days later with 
Dan and Carrie Edwards, Lunneborg, and Lunneborg's fiancee Brenda. Two days after 
that dinner Lunneborg reviewed several of MFL's financial reports provided by Carrie 
Edwards. Two days after that, Lunneborg visited MFL's offices to accept Dan Edwards' 
offer of employment as COO of MFL. It was now April 2, 2014. As mentioned above, 
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the employment contract was signed April 16, 2014, and Lunneborg's first day as COO 
of MFL was May 21, 2014. Sixty-nine days later, on July 29, 2014, Dan Edwards 
terminated Lunneborg's employment. Defs' Ex. A, p. 500. That letter reads: 
DearTom: 
You are aware of the several instances in which I have expressed concern 
with your performance in your position at MyFunLIFE, Inc. After 
repeatedly attempting to resolve those matters without success, 
MyFunLIFE has finally decided to terminate your employment, effective 
immediately. 
Your termination is for cause, for the following reasons: 
1. The central purpose of your employment here was to bring health and 
nutritional products to market. You are unable to make any significant 
progress to that end, and whenever I have encouraged you to work on 
that goal, you have refused to take action, citing roadblocks that you claim 
prevent the development of new products. 
2. I have also learned that you have been negotiating a consulting 
agreement with your former employer that would expressly prohibit your 
from bringing other new products to market. This is in direct competition 
with your duties at MyFunLIFE and a serious breach of your obligations to 
us. We cannot continue to pay an employee who not only fails to perform 
the central functions of his position, but is motivated to continue in that 
failure by an outside consulting arrangement that requires continued 
inaction. 
We regret that we are forced to take this action and wish you the very besf 
in your future professional endeavors. 
Sincerely, 
MyFunLIFE 
Dan Edwards, CEO 
Id. The problem for Dan Edwards and MFL is neither of the two reasons given are true. 
Neither of the two reasons are supported by the evidence. 
Regarding the first reason, the Court finds that a purpose of Lunneborg's 
employment was to bring health and nutritional products to market, but that was not 
''the central purpose." The Court finds that in the two months he worked as COO for 
MFL, Lunneborg could not have made "any significant progress to that end [bringing 
nutritional products to market]", especially when Dan Edwards had not identified a 
specific product and Dan Edwards had failed to lock up Schlapfer to formulate such a 
product. 
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Regarding the second reason, the purported conflict with Oxyfresh, Dan 
Edwards knew all along that Lunneborg would be staying on to help Brooke and 
Oxyfresh. Also, Dan Edwards is entirely mistaken that Lunneborg had "been 
negotiating a consulting agreement with your former employer that would expressly 
prohibit you from bringing other new products to market." No agreement was ever 
reached between Lunneborg and Brooke. 
The Court will discuss in detail each of these two reasons given by Dan 
Edwards. 
Reason 1: The "central purpose" of hiring Lunneborg was not to develop 
new health and nutritional products; it was to run MFL. Dan Edwards did 
not Identify a new health and/or nutritional product and approve research 
and development of that product, let alone approve the manufacture of that 
product. Dan Edwards did not hire Schlapfer who was essential to · 
formulating any new health or nutritional product. 
The Court finds Lunneborg has proven MFL breached its contract with 
Lunneborg by firing him without cause and without paying him his six months' 
severance. In coming to that finding, it is important to understand Lunneborg's contract 
of employment. It is important to understand what he was hired to do. It is important to 
understand what Lunneborg was tasked to do and what he was capable of doing and 
not capable of doing for MFL. It is important to know what Lunneborg controlled and 
what he did not control. It is important to know what Dan and Carrie Edwards controlled 
and did not control. It is important to know what Robert Brooke controlled and did not 
control. 
The Court finds MFL breached its contract with Lunneborg by firing him without 
cause and not paying his severance, because Lunneborg was not responsible for the 
first two steps in "bringing a nutritional product to market." First, Dan Edwards was the 
one to make the determination of what product to bring to market. Second, Dan 
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Edwards was responsible for obtaining the services of Schlapfer to formulate that 
nutritional product. Only then could Lunneborg do what he was hired to do, and that is 
to arrange the production, distribution and marketing of that product. 
The contract of employment hired Lunneborg as COO of MFL. The Offer of 
Employment reads: "Position. You will serve in a full"time capacity as Chief Operating 
Officer of the Company. You will report to the CEO." Defs' Ex. A, p. 341. This shows 
Dan Edwards retained the ultimate say. Lunneborg testified at trial that "I had no 
authority to go forward on a product without Dan's agreement, to go forward we had to 
have capital available." Lunneborg also testified that, "We [MFL] didn't have a 
consulting agreement with Dr. Schlapfer while I was working there." Dan Edwards was 
asked at trial whether Lunneborg had the authority to choose what MFL developed. 
Dan Edwards response was rambling, but eventually Dan Edwards was pinned down 
and testified, "I had ultimate say, but it was up to them, they kept stalling." Dan 
Edwards admits he had the ultimate say, not Lunneborg. 
Dan Edwards would have the Court believe that Lunneborg was hired primarily to 
develop products for MFL. Dan Edwards made that claim multiple times at trial and in 
his briefing. Indeed, much of the testimony at the trial was each side trying to prove 
their understanding of what Lunneborg was hired to do for MFL. This is understandable. 
Dan Edwards needs the Court to believe his claim that Lunneborg was hired primarily to 
develop products for MFL because that claim was the first reason given to Lunneborg 
by Dan Edwards in the above termination letter. 
Lunneborg would have the Court believe that he was primarily hired by Dan 
Edwards to run MFL, and that part of his duties in running MFL was to develop 
products. The Court finds the evidence supports Lunneborg's claim that the primary 
focus of his job was to run MFL. That is what Dan Edwards stated in his texts. On 
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March 29, 2014, in a text from Dan Edwards to Lunneborg: "I don't particularly care to 
run day to day operations." Pl.'s Ex. 19, p. 1. That is what Dan Edwards told his 
members or affiliates In his webcast on Lunneborg's first day of work. Dan Edwards 
said, "I love being in the field, can't stand all the details. I want to be with you, in your 
homes, in hotel rooms." Pl.'s Ex. 50. At the beginning of that web cast, Dan Edwards 
introduced Lunneborg as COO, said, "I love this guy," and 11He will be overseeing 
operations and marketing." Id. A little later Lunneborg said he, "saw an opportunity 
with my skills to focus more on the creative side," and "I'm a nuts and bolts kind of guy.'' 
Id. Dan Edwards said , "We're adding products, like spokes on the wheel.'' Lunneborg 
then said, "I get to help bring other things to market - couldn't pass up that opportunity." 
Id. Further proving that Dan Edwards was hiring Lunneborg to run MFL (and not just 
develop products) was the fact that Dan and Carrie Edwards took a vacation the first 
two weeks that Lunneborg began working, and before they left, Dan Edwards 
introduced him to all the employees of MFL (and the Edwards' other businesses), and 
Dan Edwards told the employees to take direction from Lunneborg. 
Lunneborg was hired by Dan and Carrie Edwards to run MFL as its COO. As 
just mentioned above, the contract states Lunneborg will report to Dan Edwards: "You 
will report to the CEO." Thus, this Court finds any new product Lunneborg proposed to 
be brought to market would need Dan Edwards' approval. This Court also finds that if 
the product were a "nutritional" product, Lunneborg could not bring the proposed . 
product to market by himself. He would need someone like Schlapfer to help him. 
Certainly product development was a part of Lunneborg's job as COO, but not 
the only responsibility. When Lunneborg started, MFL was already an up and running 
corporation, a corporation which had "sold" memberships to access travel 
accommodation discounts, a corporation which wanted to develop other "products", 
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products which their existing members would then buy and sell to other members, and 
get those other members to buy from them and sell to others. Some of the products 
which MFL wanted to develop may have been "nutritional", some were not. Defs' Ex. A, 
p. 492. 
The evidence shows that Dan Edwards was deferring to Lunneborg as to when 
any product was ready to launch. In a text from Lunneborg to Schlapfer on 
March 29, 2014, Lunneborg wrote: 
Dan is going to let me go through all the company's financials on Monday. 
They had good answers to all my questions. Brenda had a great feeling 
on both. Dan said he wants you and I to decide when the product is 
ready for launch not him. He has capital to pay cash for us and 
production I get to see that Monday. He is pushing hard for me to join as 
coo or pres. He does not want to handle running this place. 
Pl..'s Ex. 11. (emphasis added). Keep in mind this was written about eighteen days 
before Lunneborg and Dan Edwards signed the employment contract and about seven 
weeks before Lunneborg began working as COO for MFL. At that time, Lunneborg and 
Schlapfer obviously both contemplated working with Dan Edwards and MFL. The 
problem is Dan Edwards never went out and locked up Schlapfer. But in that above 
message, Lunneborg's understanding that Lunneborg would decide when the product 
was ready to launch and not Edwards, is corroborated by a text from Dan Edwards to 
Lunneborg the same date, March 29, 2014: 
I want you to know that I am looking for someone like yourself, that knows 
this business to run my company so I can go into the field to recruit and 
train our teams. I don't particularly care to run day to day operations. I 
love working directly with the field . 
Pl.'s Ex. 19, p. 1. This makes it clear that Dan Edwards was hiring Lunneborg to run 
MFL, not just handle product development. And while Dan Edwards may have given 
Lunneborg final say as to when a product is ready to launch (as set forth in the above 
message between Lunneborg and Schlapfer), it is clear Dan Edwards retained final say 
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is to whether a product would be developed and what product that might be. On May 
22, 2014, Dan Edwards texted to Lunneborg: 
You are COO and "If" we decide to launch a nutrition product, then you 
will be the COO for that product also. It really is NON [sic] of his business 
what you and I decide to do. 
Pl's Ex. 19, p. 3. 
Carrie Edwards stated Lunneborg was not going to develop products alone, 
recognizing that Lunneborg did not develop products alone when he worked for 
Oxyfresh. On May 21, 2014, Carrie Edwards prepared an announcement for 
Lunneborg as COO of MFL, stating 
In his corporate life, Tom was highly recognized for his leadership abilities. 
He advanced through multiple departments and was quickly propelled into 
a top Executive position. He oversaw all global manufacturing, logistics, 
purchasing, costing and R&D. During his tenure he helped create, 
improve, and foster over 60 personal care, nutrition , and pet care 
products. 
Pl.'s Ex. 36, p. 1. (emphasis added). 
When Dan Edwards testified at trial in the plaintiffs case, he testified that some 
time shortly after the July 15, 2014, email shown in Plaintiff's Exhibit 35, "Brooke asked 
me if I hired Tom [Lunneborg] to build a nutrition product, and I said 'I did."' Dan 
Edwards then testified, "Brooke asked me if we were doing a Life Shotz type drink, I 
told him we hadn't determined what we were going to build .,. The next day, on July 16, 
2014, Carrie Edwards' Skype text to Lunneborg corroborates the fact that as of that 
time, Dan Edwards had not determined what the "nutritional product" might be, and 
corroborates that it would be Dan Edwards who would make that decision. That Skype 
message from Carrie Edwards to Lunneborg discusses the conversation between Dan 
Edwards and Richard Brooke the night before, which Carrie Edwards wrote she "was 
present on the conversations", and reads: 
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Basically I am surprised you lasted as long as you did with a man like that. 
I am literally dumbfounded when adults behave that way. But NO, Dan 
did not say you were hired only to bring us products! He did express that 
he realizes your talents extend far beyond what you are currently doing 
and when/if we decide to expand to different markets that you will 
(obviously) be right there with us! 
Pl.'s Ex. 36, p. 3. Dan Edwards was asked about this at trial, and his explanation was 
that, "Carrie was sugarcoating this back to Tom [Lunneborg] so he didn't raise up red 
flags." That explanation really makes no sense. Even if that explanation were true, it 
would simply mean that Dan Edwards admitted under oath that his wife was lying to 
Lunneborg. Dan Edwards' explanation makes no sense. Why would he have his wife 
lie to Lunneborg about what they were telling Brooke? The Court finds Dan Edwards 
not to be credible in his 11sugarcoating" explanation. The Court finds two weeks before 
Dan Edwards fired Lunneborg for not bringing a nutritional product to market, Dan 
Edwards had not even determined what that product might be. The Court also finds 
that Dan Edwards would be the one to make final approval of whether MFL's assets 
would be directed to research and development of a product, and that Dan Edwards 
would make such a decision only after he made the decision on what the product 
should be. Dan Edwards can fire Lunneborg without cause but he has to pay a penalty. 
Dan Edwards cannot fire Lunneborg without cause without paying six months of 
Lunneborg's salary. This Court finds Dan Edwards fired Lunneborg without cause. It is 
not sufficient cause for Dan Edwards to fire Lunneborg for his alleged failure 11to bring 
health and nutritional products to market'' when Dan Edwards was the one to decide 
what product should be brought to market and, within the first two months of 
Lunneborg's employment, Dan Edwards had not made that determination. 
But most importantly, as to any nutritional product, Lunneborg was not hired to 
actually develop the product and bring it to market by himself. Lunneborg is not a 
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doctor; he is not a chemist. Lunneborg's skills are bringing the product to production, 
marketing the product, and distributing the product. The only person in the mix who 
could actually come up with the formulation for a product was Schlapfer. 
Therein lies the problem--no one person and no business entity controlled 
Schlapfer. While Schlapfer had done business for Oxyfresh, Oxyfresh didn't control 
Schlapfer. While Lunneborg had worked with Schlapfer at Oxyfresh, Lunneborg didn't 
control Schlapfer. While Schlapfer had put Dan Edwards in touch with Lunneborg, Dan 
Edwards did not control Schlapfer. When asked at trial why he had not gotten Dr. 
Schlapfer on contract with MFL, Dan Edwards testified, "We were working on it." The 
Court finds that the task of getting Schlapfer on contract with MFL was upon Dan 
Edwards, and Dan Edwards failed in that regard . 
If Dan Edwards had wanted a nutritional product within the first two months of 
Lunneborg's employment, Dan Edwards needed to get Schlapfer working for him in 
some capacity. That never occurred in the two months Lunneborg worked for MFL as 
COO. Dan Edwards, as CEO of MFL, and the sole owner of MFL, was the person to 
get Schlapfer working for MFL in some capacity. The evidence shows that a lot of 
lunches and dinners took place where Dan Edwards, Carrie Edwards, Lunneborg and 
Schlapfer "talked" about Ideas and brainstormed about product areas, maybe even 
specific products, but that is all the further it went before Dan Edwards terminated 
Lunneborg. The evidence also shows that Dan Edwards would be the one to decide if 
an actual product idea would have the resources of MFL poured toward it to bring it to 
market. 
There is a discrepancy as to how long it might take to bring a product to market. 
However, the evidence is uncontroverted that it would take more than the two months 
Dan Edwards gave Lunneborg. Lunneborg testified he had helped create over 60 
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products for Oxyfresh, about 30 of which were brought to market. He testified it took 
two years to develop LifeShotz for Brooke. He explained why the process takes time. 
Lunneborg testified the first step is to determine what we want the product to do, then 
formulate the product, then look for contraindications with the ingredients and look at 
the stability of all the ingredients, look at applicable regulations, partner with a 
laboratory to develop a prototype, and test the prnduct with a focus group for taste, 
texture, and color; and then once the final formulation is decided upon you negotiate 
with a manufacturer, develop packaging, and determine how it is to be distributed. 
Lunneborg testified that once the final formulation is established it takes at least . 
another eight to ten weeks for a manufacturer to create the first batch of the product. 
On the other hand, Dan Edwards testified Schlapfer formulated a product for a person 
named Wendy in eight days. But Dan Edwards' inference that Lunneborg could have 
immediately brought a nutritional product to market for MFL is belied by Dan Edwards' 
own notes. Dan Edwards identified his notes from a meeting between he, Lunneborg 
and Schlapfer held on July 25, 2014. Defendants' Exhibit A, p. 499. Dan Edwards' 
own handwritten notes from that meeting read: "8-10 weeks to get formulation ready" 
and "8-12 weeks manufacturing." This is written four days before Dan Edwards 
terminated Lunneborg. This conclusively proves the reasons set forth in Dan Edwards 
termination letter are false ... Lunneborg was not being terminated for not bringing a 
nutritional product to market for Dan Edwards. Four days earlier Dan Edwards knew 
from talking to Schlapfer and Lunneborg that even at that time they were 16 weeks to 
22 weeks away, even if they had a product identified, which they did not. Dan Edwards 
testified that these weeks were set forth by either Lunneborg or Schlapfer. Dan 
Edwards testified that was the estimated weeks to bring a health or nutrition product to 
market. Dan Edwards testified at trial that in that meeting "we weren 't specific on the 
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product." Dan Edwards testified that "This was a brand new idea for all of us." So on 
July 25, 2014, Dan Edwards admits he had no product identified, that this was a new 
idea for the three of them, and yet, five days later he terminates Lunneborg because he 
failed to bring a nutritional product to market? Dan Edwards is lying as to the reason he 
terminated Lunneborg. 
Dan Edwards terminated Lunneborg for not bringing a nutritional product to 
market within his first two months of employment. Due to the fact that Dan Edwards 
was CEO of MFL and due to the fact that it would be Dan and Carrie Edwards money 
that would be used to bring any identified product to market, it is clear Dan Edwards 
had the ultimate say as to what product would be developed. There is no evidence that 
Dan Edwards gave the "green light" to any product that Lunneborg then refused to take 
steps to bring to market. Even if he had, given the fact that Dan Edwards did not 
supply Lunneborg with the key person to make that happen, specifically Schlapfer, not 
bringing a product to market was simply not Lunneborg's responsibility within that two-
month time frame. 
Reason 2: Dan Edwards knew Lunneborg kept a relationship with 
Oxyfresh/Brooke, and was mistaken that Lunneborg's former employer 
Oxyfresh/Brooke had specifically prohibited Lunneborg from developing 
new products for MFL. 
There was extensive testimony at trial about the final days of Lunneborg's 
employment, when Dan Edwards met with Brooke and received documented 
information from Brooke about Lunneborg. Why in these final days Dan Edwards 
chose to get all his information from Brooke about what was going on between Brooke 
and Lunneborg, and not get any information from his own employee/COO/Lunneborg, 
is a mystery. Brooke is, in a way, Dan Edwards' competitor. Dan Edwards' decision to 
listen to Brooke, to the exclusion of his own COO Lunneborg, is an important reason 
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this Court finds Dan Edwards fired Lunneborg without cause. 
As set forth above, Dan Edwards' second reason to Lunneborg for his 
termination was: 
I have also learned that you have been negotiating a consulting 
agreement with your former employer that would expressly prohibit your 
from bringing other new products to market. This is in direct competition 
with your duties at MyFunLIFE and a serious breach of your obligations to 
us. We cannot continue to pay an employee who not only fails to perform 
the central functions of his position, but is motivated to continue in that 
failure by an outside consulting arrangement that requires continued 
inaction. 
Defs' Ex, A, p. 500. The first phrase "I have also learned ... ", is important. The 
evidence is overwhelming that Dan Edwards "learned" about any agreement prohibiting 
Lunneborg from bringing new products to market for MFL only through Brooke, 
completely ignoring Lunneborg. The phrase " .. . you have been negotiating .. . " is also 
important. The evidence is overwhelming that in fact no agreement was ever signed 
between Brooke and Lunneborg. 
Dan Edwards testified he had a meeting with Brooke on July 15, 2014. The 
topics of discussion of that meeting were set forth in an email from Brooke to Melissa 
Gulbrandson. That email reads: 
Just had a good conversation with Dan Edwards the guy that hired Tom 
[Lunneborg]. Here is what he told me 
1. He specifically hired Tom to develop products .. everything from a 
nutritional drink to sunscreen not to run his companies. 
2. That has been there [sic] plan from day one and Tom has been 
involved in all those conversations. 
3. That if Tom signs the contract he has in hand specifying that he will not 
be doing products for Myfunlife, Dan will have to terminate him 
immediately. 
4. He wants a LifeShotz products as his top priority 
Defs' Ex. A , p. 4. Dan Edwards was asked about that email at trial. 
As to topic one, Dan Edwards testified he did tell that to Brooke in their meeting 
(that he specifically hired Lunneborg to develop products ... not run his companies) , but 
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then he testified that he did not tell Lunneborg that he had told Brooke that. Why would 
Dan Edwards admit to lying to Brooke, and then keep the fact that he told Brooke that 
lie a secret from Lunneborg? If Dan Edwards told Brooke that Dan Edwards hired 
Lunneborg to develop products and not to run the company, this Court finds that is a lie. 
The fact that it Is a lie is made clear from the employment contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
13B, that he was hired as the Chief Operating Officer), and the lie is made clear by Dan 
Edwards' own statements in his webcast. But it gets even weirder. The next day 
Lunneborg texts Carrie Edwards, telling her he got a copy of Brooke's email aboul the 
meeting. Pl.'s Ex. 36, p. 2. Lunneborg asked her about the portion of that email which 
read, " ... last night Dan told him [Brooke] he never hired me to run his companies, he 
only hired me to make products for you guys." Id. In response, Carrie Edwards lies to 
Lunneborg about the lie Dan Edwards told Brooke, when she wrote: "But, NO, Dan did 
not say you were hired only to bring us products!" Id. 
Dan Edwards' Topic two is not relevant. 
As to topic three, that if Lunneborg, "signed the contract he has in hand 
specifying that he will not be doing products for Myfunlife, Dan will have to terminate 
him immediately", Dan Edwards was asked at trial , "Doesn't that imply that Tom had not 
signed a contract?" Dan Edwards answer was as obtuse as it was disingenuous. He 
would not agree with the statement in that question, and then testified , "I took it to mean 
the contract we were being asked to sign.'' To which Dan Edwards was then asked, 
"You knew you hadn't signed the agreement?" Dan Edwards had to admit that. Thus, 
Dan Edwards fired Lunneborg as if Lunneborg had signed a contract with Brooke, while 
ignoring the fact that Lunneborg had never signed such a contract. Dan Edwards own 
termination letter makes that fact clear. Defs' Ex. A, p. 500. However, Dan Edwards 
act of terminating Lunneborg is not consistent with that fact. And before Dan Edwards 
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terminated Lunneborg, Dan Edwards never asked his own employee and COO whether 
what Brooke had been telling him was true. Dan Edwards certainly never saw a 
contract between Lunneborg and Brooke, because none existed. 
Regarding the fourth topic in Brooke's email, that Dan Edwards, "wants a 
LifeShotz products as his top priority", Dan Edwards was asked at trial if he made that 
statement to Brooke, to which Dan Edwards said "No." Then Dan Edwards was asked 
"Was it your priority?" To which Dan Edwards testified, "I hated the way LifeShotz 
tasted ." That really didn't answer the question, and counsel asked the question again . 
Dan Edwards' response this time was, "I wanted an energy drink, maybe he heard me 
say I wanted an energy drink." Later in his testimony Dan Edwards testified, 11We talked 
about a LifeShotz product, we wanted an energy drink and we talked about that. " This 
fourth topic by itself might not seem that important, but it might show the seeds of Dan 
Edwards' contempt for Lunneborg. Lunneborg testified that Dan Edwards asked 
Lunneborg to make a copy of the LifeShtoz formula. Lunneborg testified that after he 
had started working at MFL, Dan Edwards called him at home as he was getting his RV 
ready, and said 111 want you to make a mirror image of that. " Lunneborg testified that he 
told him that we couldn't do that, to which Dan got upset. Lunneborg testified that a 
short time later Dan Edwards called him back and had calmed down, and that it 
seemed like we were fine. All of this testimony by Lunneborg is corroborated by text 
messages between Lunneborg and Schlapfer. Pl.'s Ex. 30, p. 7. Lunneborg texted 
Schlapfer: 
You and I have to sit down soon. Dan kind of lost his marbles with me 
last night. He round about asked me to knock off LS and then I insinuated 
he could reverse engineer it. I told him he isn't clear on the undertaking 
that would be and that I will never copy a formula that I was part of at oxy. 
He got a little hot and it all came as a huge surprise to me. Need to give 
you all the details. He has zero focus and gets excited about whatever 
the next idea is that crops up. 
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Id. This is corroborated by Schlapfer's testimony in his deposition for trial. Schlapfer 
testified: 
Q And during the time between April and July of 2014, did you 
have any conversations with Dan Edwards regarding Life Shotz? 
A Yes. 
Q And can you describe those conversations to us? 
A Dan was very interested in having Tom and I develop a product 
for his company that was, he referred to, as a mirror image of Life Shatz. 
Q Are you telling me that Dan asked you and Tom to create a 
mirror image of Life Shatz for MyFunLIFE? 
A Yes. In fact -
Q And how did you --
A Go ahead. 
Q How did you respond to that request? 
A Absolutely no, that it was unethical 
Q And at that time you were still consulting with Oxyfresh; correct? 
A Correct. I still am. 
Q How did Mr. Edwards react to that? 
A He asked more than once the same basic question. I found it a 
little peculiar and, consequently, I put it in my journal. I'm a writer. I keep 
a lot of notes about things that I'm thinking about or find interesting. So I 
actually found it in my journal. 
Q What did you put in your journal? 
A I have it with me, if you give me a moment to find it. 
Pl.'s Ex. 48, p. 14, L. 23 - p. 15, L. 25. Schlapfer was then asked to read the entry into 
the record. 
Q Go ahead. Do you have that entry in front of you now? 
A I did. I found it. I had to do a lot of digging in my journals because I 
have a lot of journals. But I found this dated July 26th, 2014. Quote, "I 
think I should make a note of a request that Dan Edwards made to me 
recently, since it may be relevant to Tom's case in the future. I understand 
that he also made the same request of Tom. He asked if Tom and I could 
make a," quote, "'mirror image,' i.e., a copy of Life Shtoz for MyFunLIFE, 
his company. The answer, absolutely not, unethical to do so. Besides, it 
is not in Tom's contract with MyFunLIFE to design and make products. 
He was hired as operations manager," end of quote. 
Id., p. 16, L. 15 - p. 17, L. 3. At trial, Dan Edwards was asked if he asked Lunneborg to 
make a mirror image of LifeShotz, to which Dan Edwards testified, "That's false." Then , 
Dan Edwards testified, "I said make an energy drink, like LifeShotz or Red Bull. " Dan 
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Edwards testified at least four times at trial how much he detested the taste of 
LifeShotz. Dan Edwards may have overemphasized that to make it seem less likely 
that he really did as Lunneborg and Schlapfer to simply copy the LifeShotz formula. 
The Court finds Lunneborg and Schlapfer credible on this point, that Dan Edwards 
specifically asked them to make an illegal mirror image of LifeShotz. 
It seems to this Court that Dan Edwards hired Lunneborg thinking he could 
simply copy LifeShotz and bring a product to market nearly instantaneously. It is 
apparent Dan Edwards needed a physical product to sell along with his vacation 
discounts, in order to not run afoul of multilevel marketing laws. It is obvious that Dan 
Edwards was in a hurry to do this because he'd just fired his prior COO and had taken 
two more months to hire Lunneborg. When Lunneborg couldn't bring a product to 
market overnight, Dan Edwards fired him, using the information or misinformation from 
Boorks and an imagined conflict of interest between Lunneborg and Oxyfresh/Brooke 
as the basis for his decision to fire Lunneborg. This is all corroborated by Schlapfer's 
testimony: 
Q Did Dan [Edwards] ever appear hostile to you when discussing 
Life Shatz or product development with you and/or Tom [Lunneborg]? 
A One time. The very last meeting that we had at his office, the 
only time I attended his office, he was very interested in Tom and I 
becoming a part of the company and wanting to branch off and develop 
some products for him. And there was a confrontation about that because 
it was a repeat ask. And I confronted him about that and he blew up. He 
became very defensive and loud. 
Q Was this concerning the Life Shetz product? 
A It was concerning the whole idea of Tom and I joining him in the 
development of his other companies and doing product development. 
And it became an issue because neither of us were under contract to 
develop products. I was under no contract whatsoever. And Tom was not 
contracted to develop and design products. But he kept asking. And 
finally it came to a head. And I think that may have been provocative. 
Q I did not hear that. 
A I think that may have become provocative. And Tom was fired 
soon after that meeting. 
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Pl.'s Ex. 48, p. 18, L. 23 - p. 19, L. 20. 
This proves several things in this Court's findings. First, the Court finds 
Lunneborg and Schlapfer to be credible, and Dan Edwards not to be credible. Second, 
this proves that Lunneborg was not hired primarily to develop products. Third, it proves 
that Schlapfer would be necessary in the development of any nutritional product for 
MFL. Fourth, it proves that Dan Edwards on behalf of MFL never had Schlaper under 
contract. Fifth, it proves that just prior to Dan Edwards act of firing Lunneborg, Dan 
Edwards had yet to identify a product for Lunneborg and Schlapfer to develop. These 
were all problems of Dan Edwards' own making. These were not problems created by 
Lunneborg. This Court finds the real reason Dan Edwards fired Lunneborg was 
because he refused to make a mirror image of LifeShotz and developing another 
product would best case take many months, and worst case, could not occur due to the 
pieces of the puzzle Dan Edwards had yet to acquire ... namely, Schlapfer. Sixth, this 
proves that the stated reason by Dan Edwards, the imagined or fabricated conflict Dan 
Edwards created between Brooke and Lunneborg when in fact there was no conflict 
because there was no contract between those two, causes Dan Edwards' stated · 
decision to terminate Lunneborg to be made without cause. 
The Court finds the three~way soap opera dysfunction between Oxyfresh/Brooke 
and Lunneborg and Dan Edwards (with Schlapfer in the center of that triangle) really 
does not enter significantly into this Court's analysis of this lawsuit. The Court finds 
such for two reasons. First, MFL had never identified a product that Lunneborg had 
delayed. Second, Dan Edwards cannot base his decision to terminate Lunneborg upon 
his conversations about what Brooke told Dan Edwards about Lunneborg or what 
Schlapfer told Dan Edwards about Lunneborg, as neither Brooke nor Schlapfer were 
Lunneborg's agents. Lunneborg had no control over Brooke or Schlapfer. It is clear 
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Dan Edwards made his decision to terminate Lunneborg based on his conversations 
with Brooke and Sch)apfer. Dan Edwards did not even ask Lunneborg for his side of 
the story on any "conflict" that Brooke might have mentioned to Dan Edwards. Dan 
Edwards never found out there was no agreement between Brooke and Lunneborg. 
Dan Edwards jumped the gun. Without seeing any written contract proving what 
Brooke supposedly told Dan Edwards about Lunneborg being contractually bound to 
Oxyfresh, Dan Edwards chose to fire Lunneborg based only on conversations he had 
with other people. Dan Edwards fired Lunneborg based on false rumor. 
Dan Edwards was asked by his attorney at trial in the defense case-in-chief, 
"When were you first aware plaintiff wanted to consult with Brooker, to which Dan 
Edwards really didn't answer that question, but then stated, "I had no problem with it, I 
didn't want Brooke to be hurt, Plaintiff told me it would be a couple hours a week at 
lunch time, and that seemed reasonable." It is uncontradicted that Dan Edwards knew 
Lunneborg still performed some work for Brooke. This knowledge makes the fact that 
Dan Edwards fired Lunneborg based on an unsubstantiated rumor all the more 
untenable. These facts deprive Dan Edwards of his ability to claim his firing of 
Lunneborg was "for cause." 
The evidence is uncontradicted that Dan Edwards made up his mind to terminate 
Lunneborg only based on what Brooke and Schlapfer were telling him. Dan Edwards 
never confronted Lunneborg about any misinformation Dan Edwards obtained from his 
conversations with Brooke .. . Dan Edwards simply handed him the letter and terminated 
Lunneborg. It seems that Dan Edwards let his undying respect for Richard Brooke 
entirely supplant any loyalty to his COO Lunneborg. Dan Edwards chose to listen to 
Brooke and not even give Lunneborg the chance to respond. That is a termination 
without cause. 
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There are two other miscellaneous facts which inure to Lunneborg's benefit in 
proving he was terminated without cause. 
First, Dan Edwards went without any COO for April and May 2014, yet Dan 
Edwards only gave Lunneborg two months before terminating him. Dan Edwards 
testified about the wrongdoings of his previous COO, testified that he had no COO in 
April and May, thus he was anxious to hire Lunneborg the end of May. Yet, Dan 
Edwards only gave him two months before Dan Edwards terminated Lunneborg. That 
makes absolutely no business sense. That makes no common sense. It is a lie by Dan 
Edwards that he was terminating Lunneborg for failing to bring a nutritional product to 
market. 
Second, Lunneborg testified that he, Schlapfer and Dan Edwards had a meeting 
where Dan Edwards stated he was afraid of Richard Brooke, was afraid to make him 
mad, and the three brainstormed other business entities other than a multi-level 
marketing company to sell nutritional products. The notes of that meeting show it 
occurred on July 24, 2014, just four days before Dan Edwards terminated Lunneborg. 
Defs' Ex. 1, p. 499. Lunneborg testified Dan Edwards discussed forming another 
corporation, and hiring Lunneborg within the new corporation, and that Lunneborg 
would have to resign from MFL before being hired in the new corporation. Lunneborg 
testified he asked Dan Edwards why he had to resign first, to which Dan Edwards 
responded "he had a fiduciary duty to his shareholders and members." Dan Edwards 
then told Lunneborg he would have to resign or he would be terminated. Lunneborg 
testified he asked Dan Edwards what he would be terminated for, and Dan Edwards 
reiterated he had a fiduciary duty to his shareholders. Dan Edwards testified similarly. 
Dan Edwards testified that he told Lunneborg that he had to resign from MFL and that 
creating a new corporation for retail sales would go quickly. Dan Edwards testified he 
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told Lunneborg that, "once we have the new corporation, then I can bring you over." 
Dan Edwards testified that he told Lunneborg, "We could pay him in the interim" but 
that Lunneborg would not resign from the contract with MFL first. Dan Edwards testified 
Lunneborg asked Dan Edwards why Lunneborg had to resign first, and Dan Edwards 
told Lunneborg, "I have a responsibility to that corporation, ethically I couldn't do it." 
This is false on so many levels. There is nothing ethically prohibiting Lunneborg from 
being COO of MFL and overlapping with being COO of a new corporation for a few 
days, or for many days. When Dan Edwards says he has a duty to the corporation, it 
must be kept in mind that Dan Edwards is the corporation. Dan Edwards was the 
only shareholder of MFL. So for Dan Edwards to tell Lunneborg that he must resign 
from MFL first because of an ethical duty to the corporation, what Dan Edwards is 
saying is "you have to resign first due to an ethical duty to me". And since Dan 
Edwards cannot pinpoint the source of that ethical duty, this Court finds what Dan_ 
Edwards was really saying is "You have to resign so I don't have to pay your severance 
pay from MFL." The "ethical duty to my shareholders" was simply a pretext by Dan 
Edwards. 
Finally, on more than one occasion at trial, Dan Edwards made the claim that he 
fired Lunneborg for not doing his job, and the contract allowed him to do that. First of 
all, Dan Edwards put in writing the two reasons he fired Lunneborg. Defs' Ex. A, p. 500. 
The Court has discussed those two reasons at length above, and finds them to be false 
and pretextual. Second, the only other potential reasons found in the record would not 
amount to firing Lunneborg for cause. One potential reason was Dan Edwards asked 
Lunneborg to create a mirror image of LifeShotz, to shich Lunneborg refused. This was 
corroborated by Schlapfer. Firing Lunneborg for not creating a mirror image of 
LifeShotz would be firing Lunneborg for refusing to commit a crime. Another potential 
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reason could be when Lunneborg realized that because MFL did not sell anything 
tangible, MFL might be an illegal pyramid scheme. This would be firing Lunneborg for 
failing to investigate possible criminal conduct. Investigating potential legal problems 
for MFL is exactly what Lunneborg was hired to do as COO. 
3. Breach of Contract and Violation Under the Idaho Wage Claim Act 
Have Been Proven. 
Lunneborg has alleged breach of contract (Campi. 5, 6, First Cause of Action) 
and has proven MFL breached its employment contract with Lunneborg by terminating 
him without cause and without paying him his $60,000.00 severance pay under that 
contract. Lunneborg also alleged a violation of the Idaho Wage Claims Act, I.C. §§ 45-
601 et seq. Id. 6, Second Cause of Action. The Court specifically finds that this 
severance pay is "compensation for the employee's own personal services" and as 
such they are the proper subject of a wage claim under I.C. § 45-615. Under that 
statute, Lunneborg is entitled to treble damages, three times the unpaid wages plus 
attorney fees. The Idaho Supreme Court recently decided Huber v. Lightforce USA, 
Inc., 159 Idaho 833,367 P.3d 228 (2016). The facts in Huber are quite similar to those 
in the present case. Huber sued his employer, Lightforce, claiming when Lightforce 
terminated Huber, the employer was obligated to pay him twelve months' pay under the 
noncompetition/nondisclosure agreement (NOA). On summary judgment, the District 
Court ruled "the amount owed under the NOA was not wages and, therefore, not 
subject to trebling under Idaho Code section 45~615." 367 P .3d at 234. Apparently, the 
District Court "concluded that the twelve months' pay was not wages because it was 
h1eant to compensate Huber for complying with the NDA's non-competition and non-
disclosure clauses and not earned in increments as services were performed or in 
consideration for services rendered." 367 P.3d at 237. The Idaho Supreme Court 
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reversed the District Court on that issue, citing Johnson v. Allied Stores Corp. , 106 
Idaho 363, 679 P.2d 640 (1984). The Idaho Supreme Court first discussed the 
definition of severance pay: 
In Johnson, this Court held that severance pay is wages because it is "a 
component of the compensation bargained for in the agreement of 
employment ... not a mere gratuity." Id. '"Severance pay' has been 
defined as '[a] sum of money usually based on length of employment for 
which an employee is eligible upon termination."' Parker v. Underwriters 
Lab., Inc., 140 Idaho 517,520, 96 P.3d 618,621 (2004) (quoting 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed.2000)). 
"The purpose of a severance plan is to protect employees from economic 
hardship and to reward them for past service to the company." Id. 
(quoting 27 Am. Jur. 2d Emp't Relationship§ 70 (1996)) (emphasis 
added). Although in Parkerthis Court was defining "severance pay" under 
an administrative provision unrelated to the IWCA, the Court's reasoning 
is nevertheless instructive on this issue. 
367 P.3d at 237. The Idaho Supreme Court in Huberthen discussed whether the 
twelve months' pay was severance pay, or, whether it was similar to payment for a 
release of claims against the employer, which would not be wages. 
Under Parker, severance pay is a distinct form of compensation in that it 
is intended to compensate an employee for past service and protect an 
employee from economic hardship. This is consistent with Johnson, 
where this court held that severance pay was wages because it is part of 
the bargained-for compensation for employment services. See Johnson, 
106 Idaho at 367, 679 P.2d at 644. In Parker, this Court distinguished 
between severance pay and pay in consideration of a release of claims, 
focusing on the terms of the agreement. 140 Idaho at 521, 96 P.3d at 
622. We held that a payment made in exchange for a release of cla ims 
against an employer was not severance because it was entirely separate 
from services rendered during employment. Id. at 522, 96 P.3d at 623. 
Similarly, in Moore v. Omnicare, this Court held that compensation 
promised in an employment agreement is not wages where it is not in 
consideration for any services actually rendered during employment. 141 
Idaho 809, 819-20, 118 P.3d 141, 151-52 (2005) (holding that damages 
under a liquidation clause were not wages because they were not 
compensation for services rendered). 
367 P.3d at 237-38. Then, the Idaho Supreme Court held: 
Rather, section 3.2 seems intended to provide a severance payment. A 
severance payment is meant to "provide a salary substitute to secure the 
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employee's economic well-being during [a) period of unemployment." 
Parker, 140 Idaho at 520, 96 P.3d at 621 (internal citation omitted). Here, 
section 3.2 specifically provides that, as long as Huber is not terminated 
for performance issues or summarily dismissed, Huber would receive 
comparable compensation to his base salary for twelve months, even if 
Huber obtained other employment during that period . This provision 
seems intended to secure Huber's economic well-being. 
Based on a plain read ing of the terms of the NOA, the twelve months' pay 
is not conditioned on compliance with the non-competition conditions. 
Rather, it unambiguously provides for a severance payment that is 
intended to compensate Huber for his past service and secure his 
economic well-being. As this Court found in Johnson, severance pay 
constitutes wages under the IWCA because it is "a component of the 
compensation bargained for in the agreement of employment." 106 Idaho 
at 367, 679 P.2d at 644. 
We reverse the district court ruling that the amount owed under the NOA 
was not wages under the IWCA, and remand for the district court to treble 
the $180,000 judgment under Idaho Code section 45-615. Post-
judgment interest shall accrue on the trebled amount of $540,000 from 
December 10, 2013, the date of entry of the judgment. Whitlocl< v. Haney 
Seed Co., 114 Idaho 628, 635 1 759 P.2d 919, 926 (Ct. App. 1988). 
367 P.3d at 238. In the present case, Lunneborg testified the reason he negotiated the 
six months' pay was to protect himself as he was leaving Oxyfresh, his employer of 
nearly twenty years and taking a pay cut to become COO of MFL. This six months' pay 
is even more clearly "intended to compensate an employee for past service and protect 
an employee from economic hardship," as compared to the facts in Huber. 367 P.3d at 
237. Lunneborg's six months' salary truly was severance pay, negotiated by 
Lunneborg, agreed to by Dan Edwards, and Huber, Johnson and Parker all make clear 
that "severance pay was wages because it is part of the bargained-for compensation for 
employment services." The Court finds the evidence is uncontradicted that 
Lunneborg's yearly salary was $120,000.00, and six months' salary is $60,000.00 which 
is due to Lunneborg by MFL under the employment contract. That amount is trebled 
under the Idaho Wage Claim Act, for a total award of $180,000.00. 
Lunneborg also claimed in his Complaint that he had accumulated 114 hours of 
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paid time off while employed at MFL. Com pl. 6, ,I 5.3. The Court recalls no proof of 
this issue, and accordingly makes no award for such. 
B. MFL's Corporate Veil Must be Pierced. 
1. The Law. 
The Court adopts the law set forth by counsel for Lunneborg. Whether to 
pierce the corporate veil is an equitable question to be decided by the Court in equity 
rather than at law. In order to prove that a corporation is a shareholder's alter ego, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a unity of interest and ownership to a degree that the 
separate personalities of the corporation and individual no longer exist, and (2) if the 
acts are treated as acts of the corporation, an inequitable result would follow. 
Wandering Trails, LLC v. Big Bite Excavation, Inc., 156 Idaho 586, 594. 329 {13d 368. 
376 (2014); Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Rose Chapel Mortuary, Inc., 95 Idaho 599, 601 , 514 
P.2d 594, 596 (1973). Resolving the issue of piercing the corporate veil is heavily fact-
specific with the overriding objective being for the Court to reach an equitable result. 
Defendants are correct in pointing out that "A showing of need for vigilance in 
collecting the judgment is not a show of inequity or injustice." Defendants' Closing 
Argument Reply Brief 5, citing Baker v. Kulczyc, 112 Idaho 417 , 420, 732 P .2d 386 
(Ct. App. 1987). In other words, the fact that MFL is bankrupt is not evidence of 
inequity or injustice. 
Courts have identified numerous factors to assist in the determination of 
whether a unity of interests between the individual and the corporation exists. A party 
seeking to pierce the corporate veil need not prove all factors but it must prove at least 
one of the factors. While the listing of these various factors in court decisions are 
highly similar, they are not identical. 
In Automotive Finance Corp. v. Joliet Motors, Inc. , 761 F. Supp. 2d 789 (N.D. Ill. 
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2011), the Federal District Court identified numerous non-dispositive factors as 
follows: 
(1) Inadequate capitalization; 
(2) Failure to issue stock; 
(3) Failure to observe corporate formalities; 
(4) Nonpayment of dividends; 
(5) Insolvency of the debtor corporation; 
(6) Nonfunctioning of the other officers or directors; 
(7) Absence of corporate records; 
(8) Commingling of funds; 
(9) Diversion of assets from the corporation by or to a 
stockholder or other person or entity to the detriment of 
creditors; 
(10) Failure to maintain arm's-length relationships among related 
entities; and 
( 11) Whether, in fact, the corporation is a mere fa9ade for the 
operation of the dominant stockholders. 
761 F. Supp. 2d at 793. (quoting Fontana v. TLD Builders, Inc., 840 N.E. 2d 
767, 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). In Oceanics Schools, Inc. v. Barbour, 112 S.W.3d 
135 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), the Tennessee Court of Appeals identified the factors 
as follows: 
(1) Whether there was a failure to collect paid in capital; 
(2) Whether the corporation was grossly undercapitalized; 
(3) The non-issuance of stock certificates; 
(4) The sole ownership of stock by one individual; 
(5) The use of the same office or business location; 
(6) The employment of the same employees or attorneys; 
(7) The use of the corporation as an instrumentality or business 
conduit for an individual or another corporation; 
(8) The diversion of corporate assets by or to a stockholder or 
other entity to the detriment of creditors, or the manipulation 
of assets and liabilities in another; 
(9) The use of the corporation as a subterfuge in an illegal 
transaction; 
(10) The formation and use of the corporation to transfer to it the 
existing liability of another person or entity; and 
(11) The failure to maintain arm's-length relationships between 
related entities. 
112 S.W.3d at 140. (citiations omitted). In Wachovia Securities, LLC v. Banco 
Panamericano, Inc., 674 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2012), the Federal District Court 
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identified the factors as follows: 
(1) Inadequate capitalization; 
(2) Failure to issue stock; 
(3) Failing to observe corporate formalities; 
(4) Failing to pay dividends; 
(5) Corporate insolvency; 
(6) Nonfunctioning corporate officers; 
(7) Missing corporate records; 
(8) Commingling funds; 
(9) Diverting assets to an owner or other entity to creditor 
detriment; 
(10) Failing to maintain an arm's-length relationship among 
related entities; and 
(11) Whether the corporation is a mere far;ade for a dominant 
owner. 
674 F.3d at 752. (citing Fontana , 840 N.E.2d at 778) (applying Illinois law). Similar 
factors was set forth in In Re Philfips, 139 P.3d 639 (Colo. 2006), where the Court 
Identified the factors as being whether: 
(1) The corporation is operated as a distinct business entity; 
(2) Funds and assets are commingled; 
(3) Adequate corporate records are maintained; 
(4) The nature and form of the entity's ownership and control 
facilitate misuse by an insider; 
(5) The business is thinly capitalized; 
(6) The corporation is used as a "mere shell;" 
(7) Shareholders disregard legal formalities; and 
(8) Corporate funds or assets are used for non-corporate 
purposes. 
139 P.3d at 644. (citations omitted). 
A similar listing of factors is contained in HOK Sporl, Inc. v. FC Des Moines, LC, 
495 F.3d 927 (8th Cir. 2007) (applying Iowa law); Coughlin Construction Co. v. Nu-Tee 
Industries, Inc., 755 N.W.2d 867 (N.D. 2008); Inter-Tel Technologies, Inc. v. Linn 
Station Properties, LLC, 360 S.W.3d 152 (Ky. 2012); and Fontana v. TLO Builders, Inc. , 
840 N.E.2d 767 (111. App. Ct. 2005). 
In each of the cases cited above, under the specific facts presented, the Courts 
found that equity warranted the piercing of the corporate veil , and In re Phillips, supra, 
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the Court recognized reverse piercing of the corporate veil. Achieving an equitable 
result is the paramount goal of the doctrine of piercing of the corporate veil. In re 
Phillips , 139 P.3d at 644. 
Keep in mind, Lunneborg need only prove one factor in order to pierce the 
corporate veil of MFL and hold Dan Edwards and Carrie Edwards personally liable to 
Lunneborg. As discussed below, nearly all these various factors have been met in light 
of the facts of the present case. The acts of Dan Edwards and Carrie Edwards (and in 
some cases the inaction of Dan and Carrie Edwards) prove that the corporate veil must 
be pierced. 
2. The Facts and Analysis Regarding Piercing the Corporate Veil. 
Carrie Edwards testified that on February 22, 2013, MFL was incorporated as a 
Delaware Corporation. She testified her husband Dan Edwards was the CEO, 
President, Secretary, and sole Director of that corporation. Dan Edwards testified he 
was the sole shareholder of that corporation. Carrie Edwards testified she was the 
Chief Administrative Officer. She testified she was the COO for a few weeks before 
Lunneborg was hired and, after that, was Executive Vice President. There were no 
corporate resolutions authorizing Carrie Edwards to assume any of these positions. 
Carrie Edwards testified that no stock certificates were ever issued. She testified that 
the only corporate minutes MFL kept were the initial meeting minutes. She testified 
there were only three resolutions ever prepared in MFL's existence. She testified she 
and Dan Edwards also owned Ink Drop Signs, TraffiCorp, a tanning salon, and LFM, 
LLC, to hold their real property. She testified that MFL sold assets to TraffiCorp, rather 
than transfer notes payable, based on their accountant's advice. She testified that in 
2013 through July 2014, "our corporations gave advance monies to each other", that 
"one to two times a month, depending on cash flow" they would transfer money from 
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one corporation to another, then back again. She testified that this was done to "help 
out" their various businesses. She testified this was all kept tracl< in their records, and it 
all got paid back. Carrie Edwards testified that Exhibit H, page 1, shows money going 
from MFL to TraffiCorp. Indeed, Defendant's Exhibit H, page 1, is a record purporting 
to show $4,000.00 being paid by MFL to Ink Drop Signs and $20,000.00 being paid by 
MFL to TraffiCorp on June 28, 20.13; $10,000.00 from MFL to TraffiCorp on July 8, 
2013; $10,000.00 from MFL to TraffiCorp on August 8, 2013; $10,000.00 from MFL to 
TraffiCorp on August 23, 2013; $10,000.00 back to MFL from TraffiCorp on September 
6, 2013; $20,000.00 from MFL to TraffiCorp on February 4, 2014; $5,000.00 from MFL 
to TraffiCorp on February 5, 2014; $3,000.00 from MFL to Ink Drop Signs on February 
10, 2014; $10,000.00 from MFL to TraffiCorp on June 24, 2014; $3,500.00 from MFL to 
TraffiCorp on October 30, 2014; $5,000.00 from MFL to TraffiCorp on May 29, 2015; 
and $2,000 from MFL to TraffiCorp on August 7, 2015; $5,000.00 back to MFL from 
TraffiCorp on September 11, 2015. The one record referred to in Carrie Edwards' 
testimony shows $102,500.00 going from MFL to TraffiCorp and Ink Drop Signs, and 
only $15,000.00 has come back to MFL, all from TraffiCorp. Thus, Carrie Edwards' 
claim that "it all got paid back" is not supported by her own records. However, this 
Court has not been presented with any supporting documentary evidence that would 
back up this spreadsheet. She testified that at times MFL would make payments on 
their corporate American Express Card, at times TraffiCorp might pay. She testified 
she and Dan Edwards owned a Jeep and a 2014 Dodge Ram 1500 truck, which were 
titled in their names but the loans on the two trucks were paid by their businesses. She 
testified that neither she nor Dan Edwards received a salary. She testified that they 
received "shareholder distributions", and these shareholder distributions from MFL 
amounted to $74,830.00 in 2013, $265,684.00 in 2014, and $26,258.00 in 2015. Defs' 
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Ex. E. She testified she and Dan Edwards also received about $368,000.00 from 
purchases on MFL credit cards. She testified in 2013 she received $5,241.52 and Dan 
Edwards received $33,244.07 in commissions from MFL. Pl.'s Ex. 53. She testified 
that her children received commissions that year as well; Matt (age 17 then) received 
$4,088.72 that year, Dan Edwards Ill (age unknown) received $1 ,617.75, Brandon (age 
15 then) received $356.41, Caden (age 14 then) received $50.50, Kelsey (age 12 then) 
received $990.65, and Heidi (age 11 then) received $836.00. Id. She testified in 2014 
she received $11,045.23 and Dan Edwards received $44,411.83 in commissions from 
MFL. Pl.'s Ex. 54. She testified that her children received commissions that year as 
well; Matt received $6,567.37 that year, Dan Edwards Ill received $3,234.72, Brandon 
received $1,858.13, Caden received $2,119.47, Kelsey received $3,465.37 and Heidi 
received $2,027.22. Id. The evidence shows no corporate resolution was prepared 
and signed authorizing MFL to hire Lunneborg, fire Lunneborg, or for file bankruptcy. 
The evidence shows Dan and Carrie Edwards used the corporate credit cards for MFL 
as their own credit cards and, on occasion, adjusted the books retroactively. Carrie 
Edwards testified that by late 2014, MFL was having difficulty making payroll, so MFL 
sold several of its assets to TraffiCorp in order to make payroll at MFL, although that 
claim is not corroborated by Defendants' Exhibit I. 
Carrie Edwards testified that she attempted to have all three of the companies 
(TraffiCorp, Ink Drop Signs, MFL) operating out of 5077 N. Building Center Drive share 
the rent and utility expenses evenly. She also testified that the three companies shared 
the expenses of maintenance on the building. However, the records provided by the 
defendants do not support these claims. MFL paid the full amount of rent on the 
building ($5,000/month) for 15 straight months, August 2013 through October 2014, 
when the Edwards purchased the building through their company, Edventures, LLC. 
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Defs' Ex. H, pp. 3, 5, 8, 11 , 13, 14, 20, 22, 25, 27, 29, 32, 34, 36, 38. There is no 
record of MFL being made whole by the Edwards' other companies for this expense. 
MFL paid utility payments for the building to Kootenai Electric every month from August 
2013 through August 2014, and several months thereafter. Id., at 4, 8, 9, 13, 15, 19, 21, 
24, 26, 28, 31 , 33, 36, 43, 49. There is no record of MFL being made whole by the 
Edwards' other companies for this expense. MFL paid utility payments to the City of 
Coeur d'Alene every month from August 2013 through August 2014. Id. , at 5, 6, 9, 12, 
14, 17, 20, 23, 25, 28, 30, 34. There is no record of MFL being made whole by the 
Edwards' other companies for this expense. MFL paid utility payments to Clearwater 
Springs every month from August 2013 through July 2014. Id. , 5, 6, 9, 12, 14, 17, 20, 
23, 26, 28, 30, 32, There is no record of MFL being made whole by the Edwards' other 
companies for this expense. MFL paid utility payments to Avista every month from 
October 2013 through August 2014. Id., at 8, 9, 13, 16, 19, 22, 24, 26, 29, 31, 33, 35. 
There is no record of MFL being made whole by the Edwards' other companies for this 
expense. MFL paid property taxes on the building at 5077 N. Building Center Drive on 
three separate occasions in 2013 and 2014, totalling more than $12,000. Id., at 10, 14, 
30; see also Pl.'s Ex. 8, p. 2. There is no record of MFL being made whole by the 
Edwards' other companies for this expense. MFL paid nearly $65,000 in "Repairs and 
Maintenance" to the building at 5077 N. Building Center Drive over a 2.5-year period. 
Pl. 's Ex. 8, p. 2. There is no record of MFL being made whole by the Edwards' other 
companies for this expense. Carrie Edwards testified that she and Dan Edwards are 
the sole owners of Edventures, LLC, which now owns the building at 5077 N. Building 
Center Drive. She also testified that Edventures purchased that build ing on a "lease-to-
own" option, meaning that Edventures, and therefore the Edwardses, were personally 
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enriched by the payments made toward rent, utilities, taxes, and maintenance on _the 
building. The Edwards also considered their 2014 Jeep SRT and 2014 Dodge Ram 
1500 to be assets of MFL, using MFL funds to make loan payments and pay for over 
$29,000 in repair and maintenance between January 1, 2013 and July 30, 2015. Pl.'s 
Ex. 8, p. 2. However, they used the vehicles for personal use a substantial portion of 
the time. 
This Court finds Dan Edwards and Carrie Edwards disregarded the separate 
identity of MFL and the corporate entity of MFL. Their behavior is identical to the 
behavior in the pertinent case law which supported piercing the corporate veil. Dan 
Edwards was the sole shareholder and sole director. Dan Edwards was the CEO, the 
President, and Secretary of MFL. Dan Edwards exerted complete control over MFL. 
While under his control, MFL observed little, if any corporate formalities. The lines 
between their personal assets and the assets of all their businesses, including MFL, 
were heavily blurred. 
Dan and Carrie Edwards produced no written documents to evidence the many 
transfers of funds between themselves and their companies. There was documentary 
evidence in the form of a spreadsheet produced at trial to support Carrie Edwards' 
claim that they kept track of their money transfers from one corporation to another. 
Defs' Ex. I. However, there were no loan documents, no contracts, no bank 
statements, and no notes evidencing these transfers. There was no corporate minutes 
to document these transfers. And even the spreadsheet contradicts Carrie Edwards' 
testimony that those transfers were paid back to MFL. In fact, the limited evidence 
provided by Dan and Carrie Edwards shows MFL has been shorted about $85,000.00 
by Dan and Carrie Edwards other companies, TraffiCorp and Ink Drop Signs. 
The use of one company's funds to "help out" another company controlled by the 
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same individuals was deemed sufficient, along with the lack of corporate actions and 
meetings, to pierce the veil in Surety Life Insurance Co. v. Rose Chapel Mortuary, Inc., 
95 Idaho 599, 514 P.2d 594 (1973). In that case, the Hesses were the sole 
shareholders of two companies, and Wilford Hess was the president and manager of 
both companies. Those facts are identical to the facts in the present case, as Dan 
Edwards was the sole shareholder of MFL, and was the President, Secretary, and CEO 
of MFL. That fact, coupled with a failure to treat corporate assets as separate, 
supported the Court's decision to pierce the veil in Surety Life. The Idaho Supreme 
Court stated: 
[f]urther evidence of the fact that the separate identities of the Hesses and 
the corporations had ceased can be seen in Wilford Hess's deposition 
concerning the relationship between Hess Distributing and Rose Chapel 
wherein he stated, 'One helps the other.' Indeed, one did help the other. 
Hess Distributing provided funds to cover labor costs incurred in the 
construction of the mortuary. Some, but not all, of these funds were 
reimbursed to Rose Chapel from the loan proceeds of the Continental 
mortgage . 
... Hess Distributing was also sustaining regular losses and ... Wilford Hess 
planned to use anticipated profits derived from Rose Chapel to offset the 
losses sustained by Hess Distributing. 
Id. at 602. The Idaho Supreme Court went on to say that this behavior: 
Id. 
... without a written contract or other indicia of debt or corporate action by 
either corporation, can only indicate that Wilford and Betty Hess used the 
two corporations merely as a conduit through which to conduct their 
personal business ventures and that the separate identities of Wilford and 
Betty Hess and the corporations had ceased. 
It is undisputed that there was never any corporate action to accompany the 
transfers made between MFL and TraffiCorp or Ink Drop Signs. There is no evidence 
to show that MFL was ever paid back or made whole by TraffiCorp or Ink Drop Signs. 
Dan and Carrie Edwards, like Wilford and Betty Hess in Surety Life , used their 
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companies as conduits through which to conduct their personal financial ventures. And 
for Dan and Carrie Edwards, like Wilford and Betty Hess in Surety Life, the separate 
identities between the individuals and the corporations have ceased. Dan and Carrie 
Edwards treated MFL like their personal bank account. The corporate veil must be 
pierced. 
Lunneborg argues the Profit and Loss Statement and Balance Sheet of MFL as 
of July 30, 2015, states the total capitalization of MFL was $1,463.23. Plaintiff's Post-
Trial Brief, p. 18, citing Pl. 's Ex. 8, 4. Lunneborg argues "This capitalization is woefully 
inadequate. Capitalization of $1,000 was found inadequate in Wachovia Securities, 
supra, and capitalization of $2,000 was found inadequate in Oceanics Schools, supra, 
and likewise, capitalization of $1,000 was found inadequate in Fontana, supra." Id. 
Defendants are correct that the issue of adequate capitalization is to be measured at 
the time of the contractual agreement. Defendants' Closing Argument Reply Brief, p. 6. 
The pertinent time period here is the end of May to the end of July 2014, not July 30, 
2015. The Court finds lack of capitalization is not a factor in this case. 
However, that is the only factor or criteria which does not fall in favor of piercing 
the corporate veil of MFL. The Court has reviewed defendants' arguments to the 
contrary, and is not persuaded by them. Defendants' Closing Brief, 7-17. 
In addition to Dan and Carrie Edwards' failure to observe corporate formalities 
for MFL listed above, they disregarded corporate formalities in other ways. While Dan 
Edwards and Carrie Edwards both worked for MFL, they did not consider themselves 
as employees and did not report receiving any salary. This likely allowed them to 
successfully evade paying any social security tax, Medicare tax, federal unemployment 
tax, and Idaho unemployment tax on the distributions that they received from MFL. 
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Carrie Edwards also testified that she and Dan Edwards would receive IRS Form 1099s 
for reporting their commission or share of membership fee income. The Court agrees 
with Lunneborg; it defies belief that the president and executive vice president of a 
corporation would qualify as independent contractors for the purposes of receiving a 
Form 1099. 
MFL did not pay any dividends. A dividend is usually a distribution of money by 
a corporation to its shareholders as authorized by the corporate board of directors. 
While Carrie Edwards testified that while she and her family received over $100,000.00 
in commissions or shares of membership fees, she and her family also received 
approximately $360,000.00 in shareholder distributions. The vast majority of these 
shareholder distributions were payments by MFL of personal expenses of the Edwards 
and their family. Defs.' Ex. H, I, J, and K. On Plaintiff's Exhibit 8, the amount of these 
distributions is $367,316.71, which Carrie Edwards testified was the sum of shareholder 
distributions restated as a positive number and retained earnings. These figures do not 
include the $49,557.13 expended by MFL for car expenses for the two motor vehicles 
titled in the name of the Edwards, the approximately $2,000 per month paid by MFL as 
loan payments on the Edwards' motor vehicle loans, and the rent paid by MFL for those 
portions of the building occupied by TraffiCorp and Ink Drop Signs. The figure also 
does not consider the utility payments made by MFL for the utilities furnished to 
TraffiCorp and Ink Drop Signs, nor does it consider the $64,000 in repairs and 
maintenance to the building. None of these payments would fit the definition of a 
corporate dividend but instead constitute the diversion of corporate assets to the 
Edwards, their family, and their other solely-owned corporations. 
MFL regularly commingled funds with the funds of the Edwards and their other 
companies in the Numerica bank account. The Edwards used the MFL credit cards 
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and the MFL bank accounts as if they were their personal assets, rather than corporate 
assets. 
The Edwards were the sole owners and officers of TraffiCorp and Ink Drop Signs 
and the limited liability company that they formed to purchase the building where MFL 
and the other two corporations were located. 
Upon Lunneborg's termination from MFL on July 29, 2014, Lunneborg requested 
payment cf his severance, and Dan Edwards refused to pay it. MFL was thus aware of 
the claim of Lunneborg by approximately July 29, 2014. Notwithstanding knowledge of 
this claim, the Edwards and MFL continued the practice of diversion of corporate assets 
to the Edwards and their family without regard for the ability of MFL to meet its 
obligation to Lunneborg. Dan and Carrie Edwards inappropriately usurped so much of 
MFL's income and assets that when MFL filed for bankruptcy protection on June 22, 
2016, its total reported assets had been reduced to the nominal sum of $5.11. 
Based upon the foregoing, the first prong of the piercing of the corporate veil 
test--unity of interest--is clearly established. Further, the second prong of the test--to 
prevent an inequitable result--is also met. This second prong of the test requires 
"something less than an affirmative showing of fraud but something more than the mere 
prospect of an unsatisfied judgment." Wachovia Sec. LLC, 674 F.3d at 756. (applying 
Illinois law). 
In Fontana, a wife was the sole shareholder and sole director of a construction 
company. The husband served as the president of the company, and while he received 
no salary from the company, he was the principal, and the wife had no meaningful role 
in the corporation. At the time that a breach of contract action was filed, the corporation 
had $1.8 million in assets, which in 12 months was inexplicably reduced to zero. Under 
these facts, the court found that both prongs of the piercing of the corporate veil test 
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were satisfied and a judgment was entered against the husband to prevent injustice 
and inequitable consequences. 840 N.E.2d at 778. A nearly identical situation exists 
in this case, where MFL's assets were usurped by the Edwards via retroactive 
"shareholder distributions," and reduced to $5.11. 
The court pierced the corporate veil in Inter-Te/ Technologies, Inc. v. Linn Station 
Properties, LLC, 360 S.W.3d 152 (Ky. 2012). The court stated: "Their diversion of ITS' 
corporate income and transfer of ITS' corporate assets for their own benefit provides 
the extra 'injustice' discussed in Sea-Land, something more than simply a creditor's 
inability to collect a debt from ITS." Id. at 167. The Edwards' use of corporate assets 
for personal benefit meets this standard. 
In HOK Sport, Inc. v. FC Des Moines, L.C., 495 F.3d 927 (8th Cir. 2007) , the 
court pierced the corporate veil of a nonprofit corporation. Id. at 941 . (applying Iowa 
law). The court stated: 
Id. 
When the proprietor of a for-profit business establishes a nonprofit 
corporation to assume a liability or risk that otherwise, in the ordinary 
course of business, would have been assumed by a for-profit business, 
and when the nonprofit corporation accrued liabilities without any means 
to satisfy the liabilities, a reasonable jury may easily decide that allowing 
the for-profit business (or its owner) to escape the liability would be 
sanctioning a fraud and promoting an injustice. 
The court pierced the corporate veil in Coughlin Co. Inc. v. Nu-Tee Industries, 
Inc., 755 N.W.2d 867 (N.D. 2008) . The court found that when the dominant 
shareholder of a corporation who, through the issuance of dividends and bonuses and 
repayment of undocumented loans, bled the corporation of assets so that it would not 
be able to satisfy a known corporate liability, it justified piercing the corporate veil. Id. 
at 876. 
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The corporate veil was also pierced in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Pepper 
Source, 993 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying Illinois law). The court stated: 
At trial , Sea-Land demonstrated that Marchese obtained countless 
benefits at the expense of not only Sea-Land, but the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) and other creditors as well. Indeed, Marchese used PS 
funds to pay his personal expenses as well as expenses incurred by his 
other corporations. As a result, PS was left without sufficient funds to 
satisfy Sea-Land or PS's other creditors. American Trade Partners v. A 1 
Int'/ Importing Enter., 770 F.Supp.273, 278 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (corporate veil 
pierced on basis of unjust enrichment where managing shareholder, with 
knowledge of debt to creditor, used corporation's funds to pay personal 
expenses). Since Marchese was enriched unjustly by his intentional 
manipulation and diversion of funds from his corporate entities, to allow 
him to use these same entities to avoid liability 'would be to sanction an 
injustice.' Gromer, Wittenstrom & Meyer, P.C. v. Strom, 140 Ill. App.3d 
349, 354, 95111. Dec. 149,153,489 N.E.2d 370,374 (1986) . 
993 F.2d at 1312. 
The court likewise pierced the corporate veil in 66, Inc. v. Crestwood Commons 
Redevelopment Corporation, 998 S.W.2d 32 (Mo. 1999). The court found that "making 
a corporation a supplemental part of an economic unit and operating it without sufficient 
funds to meet obligations to those who must deal with it", was inequitable and would 
create an injustice unless the corporate veil was pierced . 
The corporate veil was also pierced in Flushing Plaza Associates # 2 v. Albert, 
102 A.D.3d 737 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). The court found that the shareholder abused 
the privilege of doing business in the corporate form by failing to observe corporate 
formalities. Id. at 739. Specifically, the fact that the shareholder caused the 
corporation to pay to him the sum of $29,500 just eleven days before judgment was 
entered against the corporation, which payment made the corporation judgment-proof, 
constituted a wrong committed against the plaintiff and to prevent injustice, the court 
allowed the corporate veil to be pierced. Id. 
Dan Edwards recruited Lunneborg to leave Oxyfresh, where Lunneborg had 
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worked for nearly 20 years, to join the Edwards at MFL. To have some protection 
against Dan Edwards changing his mind after Lunneborg joined MFL, Lunneborg 
proposed an employment contract that would pay him six months of his salary in the 
event of termination without cause. Dan Edwards then terminated Lunneborg when he 
refused to resign from MFL to become an employee of a yet-to-be-formed corporation 
to sell nutritional products to consumers at retail. Dan Edwards fabricated the alleged 
causes for Lunneborg 1s termination in his July 29, 2014, Notice of Termination. Pl.'s 
Ex. 44. At the time of the termination, MFL was obligated to pay to Lunneborg the sum 
of $10,000 per month for six consecutive months. Instead of paying the severance to 
Lunneborg as provided in his employment contract, the Edwards drained MFL of all 
Income and assets by diverting those assets and income to themselves and to 
TraffiCorp and by continuing to use the MFL credit cards for personal purchases. The 
Edwards were very successful in this diversion to the extent that they left MFL with 
$5.11 of assets by June 22, 2016. 
To allow the Edwards to escape personal liability would be to sanction an 
injustice and create an inequitable result. Under the circumstances of this case, the 
corporate veil of MFL must be pierced. Judgment will be entered against Dan and 
Carrie Edwards, jointly and severally, along with MFL. 
Ill. FINDINGS OF FACT. 
As required by I.R.C.P. 52(a)(1) the Court lists the following findings of fact, as 
per the rule, they must be specially stated and separately stated from conclusions of 
law. In doing so, the Court adopts all findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth in 
the above opinion. 
A. FACTS RELATED TO BREACH OF CONTRACT AND WAGE CLAIMS. 
1. Defendant My Fun Life ('1MFL11 ) is a travel booking company based on a multi-
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level marketing platform. 
2. Plaintiff Lunneborg (Lunneborg) was hired by MFL to serve as its Chief 
Operating Officer ("COO") for an indefinite period of time. Pl.'s Ex. 13B; Defs.' Exhibit 
A, p. 341 , 11 1 . 
3. Lunneborg and MFL entered into an employment contract on April 16, 2014. The 
employment contract stated that Lunneborg's position would be "Chief Operating 
Officer." That contract provided that if Lunneborg were to be terminated by MFL 
without cause, MFL would pay Lunneborg six months' salary as severance. Id., ,m 1, 5. 
4. Lunneborg's salary whlle employed at MFL was $120,000.00 per year, or 
$10,000.00 per month. Id., ,t 1. 
5. Throughout his tenure at MFL, Lunneborg fully and completely performed his 
duties as COO. 
6. On July 29, 2014, MFL, through Dan Edwards, terminated Lunneborg, by hand-
delivery of a termination letter. Defs.' Ex. A, p. 500. Said letter cited two alleged causes 
for Lunneborg's termination, both of which were fabrications. 
7. MFL did not pay Lunneborg severance of six months' salary ($60,000.00) upon 
his termination. 
B. FACTS RELATED TO PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL. 
8. At all times material hereto, defendants Dan and Carrie Edwards were and are 
husband and wife. 
9. Dan Edwards is the sole shareholder, director, and officer of Defendant MFL. 
Carrie Edwards is directly involved in the day-to-day management of Defendant MFL. 
10. MFL is located at 5077 N. Building Center Dr. in Coeur d'Alene, a building which 
is owned by another of Dan and Carrie Edwards' closely held companies, Edventure 
Holdings, LLC. Many other closely held companies belonging to Dan and Carrie 
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Edwards operate or at one point operated out of the same location as MFL. 
11 . MFL, through the actions of Dan Edwards and Carrie Edwards, failed to keep 
adequate corporate records to document actions, including issuance of stock, 
distributing dividends, or holding an annual meeting. 
12. Dan Edwards, as director and officer of MFL, and Carrie Edwards, as an agent 
and officer-in-fact of MFL, extensively commingled personal and MFL corporate funds, 
and corporate funds of MFL with other corporate entities owned by Dan and Carrie 
Edwards. 
13. Dan and Carrie Edwards caused many transfers of assets between themselves 
(or their other closely-held corporations) and MFL's bank accounts, without 
consideration, written contracts, indicia of debt, or official corporate action. 
14. Dan and Carrie Edwards used MFL credit cards and bank accounts for a 
multitude of personal expenses, totaling hundreds of thousands of dollars. 
15. The financial records of MFL reveal several examples of funds deposited into 
MFL accounts from other entities owned and controlled by Dan and Carrie Edwards, 
without consideration and without indicia of debt. 
16. Corporate funds belonging to MFL were regularly commingled with the funds 
belonging to other closely held corporations of Dan and Carrie Edwards to such an 
extent that the funds and accounts are indistinguishable. 
17. Corporate funds belonging to MFL were regularly commingled with the personal 
funds of Dan and Carrie Edwards to such an extent that the funds and accounts are 
indistinguishable. 
18. Although not a director of the corporation, Carrie Edwards served as an agent 
and officer-in-fact of Defendant MFL. Carrie Edwards directly benefited from using the 
corporate assets as her own. The marital community of Dan and Carrie Edwards 
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benefited from the actions of Dan Edwards. 
19. Dan and Carrie Edwards regularly treated the assets of Defendant MFL as their 
own personal assets. 
20. MFL filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and received a discharge from the 
bankruptcy court. 
21. MFL is no longer in operation. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. CONCLUSIONS RELATED TO BREACH OF CONTRACT AND 
WAGE CLAIMS. 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to I.C. § 5-514 as Defendant 
transacts business in the State of Idaho and the acts or omissions which give rise to the 
causes of action herein occurred in Kootenai County, State of Idaho. 
2. Venue is proper in Kootenai County District Court pursuant to I.C. § 5-404 since 
defendant MFL has its principal place of business in Kootenai County, the acts or 
omissions alleged herein occurred in Kootenai County, and defendants Dan and Carrie 
Edwards reside in Kootenai County. 
3. The employment contract between Lunneborg and MFL is a valid and 
enforceable contract. 
4. Lunneborg was terminated without cause because the causes stated were false 
pretexts. 
5. The failure of MFL to pay Lunneborg the severance payment as stated in the 
employment contract constitutes a breach of said contract. 
6. Severance pay is considered a "wage" under I.C. § 45-615. 
7. MFL, as an employer, owed wages to Lunneborg, as an employee, upon 
Lunneborg's termination. 
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8. The failure of MFL to pay Lunneborg his severance payment as stated in the 
employment contract is an unlawful withholding of wages under I.C. § 45-615. 
9. MFL breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing owed to 
Lunneborg by failing to perform under the contract, and by fabricating alleged causes 
for termination where none existed in fact. 
10. MFL is liable to Plaintiff for the severance payment ($60,000). 
11 . Lunneborg is entitled to three times the unpaid wages due and owing 
($180,000), plus attorneys' fees pursuant to I.C. § 45-615. 
B. CONCLUSIONS RELATED TO PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL. 
12. As the sole shareholder, director, and officer of the company, Dan Edwards 
exhibited such control over the corporation that permitting him to do so without holding 
him personally liable for the damages caused by MFL would achieve an unjust an 
inequitable result. Allowing Carrie Edwards to avoid liability for the damages caused by 
MFL would achieve an unjust and inequitable result. 
13. The separate personalities of Dan Edwards and Carrie Edwards and MFL do not 
exist. 
14. Dan Edwards and Carrie Edwards used MFL as their alter ego. 
15. MFL, Dan Edwards and Carrie Edwards must be treated as one entity to prevent 
the defendants from abusing the corporate form in an effort to avoid liability for the 
causes of action brought by Lunneborg. 
16. The corporate fiction of the Dan Edwards, Carrie Edwards and MFL--shall be 
disregarded because the entity form has been used as part of an unfair device to 
achieve an inequitable result. 
17. Dan Edwards, Carrie Edwards and MFL are jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff 
for the full measure of damages suffered by Lunneborg. 
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18. Lunneborg is the prevailing party as compared to Dan Edwards, Carrie Edwards 
and MFL. 
V. ORDER. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED plaintiff Tom Lunneborg has proven breach of contract 
and violation of the Idaho Wage Claim Act by defendant MyFunlife. Damages under 
each of those causes of action amount to $60,000.00. Under the Idaho Wage Claim Act 
cause of action, damages are trebled to the amount of $180,000.00. I.C. §§ 45-607, 45-
615. Under the Idaho Wage Claim Act, Lunneborg is also entitled to attorney fees. I.C. 
§§ 45-615 .. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff Tom Lunneborg is the prevailing party 
as to all defendants, MFL, Dan Edwards and Carrie Edwards. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the corporate veil of defendant MFL is pierced 
and defendants Dan Edwards and defendant Carrie Edwards are also jointly and 
severally liable for all damages and attorney fees. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that counsel for plaintiff Tom Lunneborg prepare a 
Judgment consistent with this opinion and order. 
Entered this 1 ih day of April, 2017. 
(ohn T\ Mitchell, District Judge 
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